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Resumen
En esta tesis se aborda el problema de la externalizacio´n segura de servicios de datos
y computacio´n. El escenario de intere´s es aquel en el que el usuario posee datos y
quiere subcontratar un servidor en la nube (“Cloud”). Adema´s, el usuario puede
querer tambie´n delegar el ca´lculo de un subconjunto de sus datos al servidor. Se
presentan dos aspectos de seguridad relacionados con este escenario, en concreto,
la integridad y la privacidad y se analizan las posibles soluciones a dichas cues-
tiones, aprovechando herramientas criptogra´ficas avanzadas, como el Autentificador
de Mensajes Homomo´rfico (“Homomorphic Message Authenticators”) y el Cifrado
Totalmente Homomo´rfico (“Fully Homomorphic Encryption”).
La contribucio´n de este trabajo es tanto teo´rica como pra´ctica. Desde el punto de
vista de la contribucio´n teo´rica, se define un nuevo esquema de externalizacio´n (en
lo siguiente, denominado con su te´rmino ingle´s Outsourcing), usando como punto
de partida los art´ıculos de [3] y [12], con el objetivo de realizar un modelo muy
gene´rico y flexible que podr´ıa emplearse para representar varios esquemas de ”out-
sourcing” seguro. Dicho modelo puede utilizarse para representar esquemas de “out-
sourcing” seguro proporcionando u´nicamente integridad, u´nicamente privacidad o,
curiosamente, integridad con privacidad. Utilizando este nuevo modelo tambie´n se
redefine un esquema altamente eficiente, construido en [12] y que se ha denominado
Outsourcinglin. Este esquema permite calcular polinomios multivariados de grado
1 sobre el anillo Z2k . Desde el punto de vista de la contribucio´n pra´ctica, se ha
construido una infraestructura marco (“Framework”) para aplicar el esquema de
“outsourcing”. Seguidamente, se ha testado dicho “Framework” con varias imple-
mentaciones, en concreto la implementacio´n del criptosistema Joye-Libert ([18]) y
la implementaciu´n del esquema propio Outsourcinglin.
En el contexto de este trabajo pra´ctico, la tesis tambie´n ha dado lugar a algunas
contribuciones innovadoras:
el disen˜o y la implementacio´n de un nuevo algoritmo de descifrado para el
esquema de cifrado Joye-Libert, en colaboraciu´n con Dar´ıo Fiore. Presenta un
mejor comportamiento frente a los algoritmos propuestos por los autores de
[18];
ii
la implementacio´n de la funcio´n eficiente pseudo-aleatoria de forma amorti-
zada cerrada (“amortized-closed-form e cient pseudorandom function”) de
[12]. Esta funcio´n no se hab´ıa implementado con anterioridad y no supone
un problema trivial, por lo que este trabajo puede llegar a ser u´til en otros
contextos.
Finalmente se han usado las implementaciones durante varias pruebas para medir
tiempos de ejecucio´n de los principales algoritmos.
iii
Abstract
In this thesis we tackle the problem of secure outsourcing of data and computation.
The scenario we are interested in is that in which a user owns some data and wants to
“outsource” it to a Cloud server. Furthermore, the user may want also to delegate
the computation over a subset of its data to the server. We present the security
issues related to this scenario, namely integrity and privacy and we analyse some
possible solutions to these two issues, exploiting advanced cryptographic tools, such
as Homomorphic Message Authenticators and Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
Our contribution is both theoretical and practical. Considering our theoretical
contribution, using as starting points the articles of [3] and [12], we introduce a new
cryptographic primitive, called Outsourcing with the aim of realizing a very generic
and flexible model that might be employed to represent several secure outsourcing
schemes. Such model can be used to represent secure outsourcing schemes that pro-
vide only integrity, only privacy or, interestingly, integrity with privacy. Using our
new model we also re-define an highly e cient scheme constructed in [12], that we
called Outsourcinglin and that is a scheme for computing multi-variate polynomials
of degree 1 over the ring Z2k . Considering our practical contribution, we build a
Framework to implement the Outsourcing scheme. Then, we test such Framework to
realize several implementations, specifically the implementation of the Joye-Libert
cryptosystem ([18]) and the implementation of our Outsourcinglin scheme.
In the context of this practical work, the thesis also led to some novel contribu-
tions:
the design and the implementation, in collaboration with Dario Fiore, of a new
decryption algorithm for the Joye-Libert encryption scheme, that performs
better than the algorithms proposed by the authors in [18];
the implementation of the amortized-closed-form e cient pseudorandom func-
tion of [12]. There was no prior implementation of this function and it repre-
sented a non trivial work, which can become useful in other contexts.
Finally we test the implementations to execute several experiments for measuring
the timing performances of the main algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud computing is a novel computing paradigm that allows users to outsource re-
sources such as storage and computing power to external providers (so-called cloud
providers). For example, a user that takes advantage of the cloud computing tech-
nology can store huge amount of data in on-line data storage or use remote software
not directly installed in the own physical computer.
In the last years we are witnessing a continuous growth of the Cloud Computing
paradigm. Some examples of applications whose success is based on such paradigm
are DropBox, Google Drive and Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2).
The reasons of the success of the Cloud Computing paradigm are multiple. For
example, users can substantially reduce the costs related to the maintenance of
their IT infrastructures; moreover, thanks to the scalability o↵ered by the Cloud
Computing services, users can change their request of resources in the time, e.g.
increasing or decreasing the required memory space or the CPU computation power.
Surely, another strong point of the Cloud Computing is also represented by the
fact that users can access to the external resources by using several devices (e.g.
computers, smartphones, tablets, etc.) located in di↵erent places.
Even if it is a very powerful technology, the Cloud Computing is also the target
of many criticisms related to the security risks to which the users are subjected.
The scenario we are interested in is that in which a user owns some data and
wants to “outsource” it to a Cloud server ( Fig. 1.1 ). Furthermore, the user may
want also to delegate the computation over a subset of its data to the server.
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Figure 1.1: Our scenario of interest.
In such scenario, if the server is untrusted ( Fig. 1.2 ), how can the user verifies
that the results provided by the server are correct? How can the user be sure that
the server does not steal information from its data?
Figure 1.2: Our scenario of interest with an untrusted server.
The security issues related to the two above questions are known as integrity
and privacy. By integrity we mean that the user wants to be sure, without having
2
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to trust the server, that the computation made by the server is e↵ectively the one
requested; moreover the user wants to obtain the result in an e cient way, namely
it should not have to re-perform the same work delegated to the server. By privacy
we mean that the user wants to be sure that the server can not steal information
from its data, as data might be sensitive (e.g. credit cards, medical records, etc.).
Of course, there could be applications in which the user needs only integrity but
not privacy or the opposite, as well as applications where the user could need both
properties.
To address the issues of privacy and integrity when outsourcing data and com-
putation to untrusted entities, a very fervent research field in cryptography is trying
to provide solutions through the development of new advanced cryptographic tools.
This work of thesis follows recent results in this research area, and our main contri-
butions are the following:
A unifying model for secure outsourcing.
There exists many works that provide protocols and schemes that aim to solve
the integrity and privacy issues. For example, as we will see in detail in the
following chapters, Homomorphic Message Authenticators (HMACs) ([3]) can
provide secure outsourcing protocols for data and computation that solve the
integrity problem; in the same way a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
scheme can provide a secure outsourcing protocol for data computation that
solves the privacy problem.
In this scenario, our contribution is to define a model that can unify and rep-
resent all such secure outsourcing protocols, namely protocols that guarantee
integrity, privacy or integrity and privacy.
Our main starting point was the recent work of D. Fiore, R. Gennaro, V. Pastro
([12]). In such article the authors propose a strong solution that allows to store
large, privacy-sensitive, datasets on a server, and get statistics or distance
measures (computed by the server) on them, with guarantees of correctness
(i.e. integrity) and privacy of the data.
In this thesis we re-define the model of [12] and we present a generic Outsourcing
scheme; using such scheme it is possible to model several possible protocols
for secure outsourcing that satisfy the two above properties of integrity and
privacy. The Outsourcing scheme is as general as possible so as to capture all
types of protocols, i.e. the protocols that guarantee only integrity, those that
guarantee only privacy and those that guarantee both integrity and privacy.
Design of a framework for implementing protocols for secure outsourcing.
Starting from the theoretical model elaborated in the previous point, as a
next we provide a framework able to implement all the protocols for secure
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outsourcing. Such framework, written in C++ with the support of external
libraries like NTL and Crypto++, has the goal of facilitating the implementa-
tion of new and existing protocols for secure outsourcing, providing common
interfaces and tools. This also helps in making comparisons among di↵erent
protocols.
Implementations of e cient schemes using the framework.
Finally, we use the novel framework developed in the previous point to realize
implementations of recently proposed protocols, for which no implementation
was known.
In [12], the authors constructed highly e cient schemes for delegation of var-
ious classes of functions, such as linear combinations, high-degree univariate
polynomials, and multivariate quadratic polynomials.
In this work of thesis, we re-define one of these schemes, that we have called
Outsourcinglin, using our new Outsourcing model. We also presente the Joye-
Libert homomorphic encryption scheme that is an encryption scheme employed
in the Outsourcinglin scheme. Regarding the Joye-Libert encryption scheme,
we want to highlight an interesting contribution of this thesis that consists of a
new decryption algorithm that performs better than the Joye-Libert decryption
algorithms.
After that we propose the theoretical re-definition of the Outsourcinglin scheme,
we implement it using our new framework. As cross result, we also implement
the Joye-Libert encryption scheme. Regarding such implementations, they
have been realized also experiments to test the performances of the main al-
gorithms.
The work of thesis is organized as follows. In the Chapter 2 we review the state
of the art of some secure outsourcing protocols, like the Homomorphic Message Au-
thenticators and the Fully Homomorphic Encryption already mentioned before. In
the Chapter 3 we present our new Outsourcing unifying model for secure outsourc-
ing, the Joye-Libert cryptosystem and the Outsourcinglin scheme. Next, Chapter
4 contains the description of the framework. In the Chapter 5 we shows the im-
plementations of the Joye-Libert cryptosystem and of the Outsourcinglin. Finally,
the Chapter 6 contains the results of several experiments realized using the imple-
mentations described in the Chapter 5.
4
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Background
2.1 Preliminary definitions and notation
In this section, we review the notation and some basic definitions that we will use
in our work. We will denote with   2 N the security parameter, and by poly( ) any
function which is bounded by a polynomial in  . We say that a function ✏ : N! R+
is negligible if and only if for every positive polynomial p( ) there exists a  0 2 N
such that for all   >  0 : ✏( ) < 1/p( ), and we compactly denote it as ✏( )=negl( ).
If S is a set, x  R S denotes the process of selecting x uniformly at random in S.
If A is a probabilistic algorithm x  R A(·) denotes the process of running A on
some appropriate input and assigning its output to x.
2.2 The problem of secure outsourcing of data
and computation
In the introduction, we have already mentioned the problem we are going to address
and the related security issues. We have seen how the Cloud Computing is a very
interesting and powerful paradigm; at the same time, the great rise in its employment
is raising many security issues. Indeed, what is the guarantee that this third-part
entity works correctly and honestly?
In this work we consider the following specific scenario of relevant interest in
practice: there is a user A that owns some data (e.g. medical data collected by
some sensors, such as blood pressure, blood oxygen level, etc.) and that wants to
continuously “outsource” all such data to a Cloud server S. At certain point in
time, A (or another user B) needs to make a computation over a subset of the data
and decides to delegate this task to S.
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It is interesting to highlight that this scenario perfectly fits to all those applica-
tions where one:
wants to outsource data without fixing in advance the size of the data, namely
it should always possible to add new data;
does not know in advance which functions he will apply on the outsourced
data, namely he may need many di↵erent computations (statistics).
Another important point to consider is that the user who can ask for the com-
putation can also be an user di↵erent from the one who outsources the data.
How we have already said in the introduction, such scenario, in presence of an
untrusted server leads to two important security problems:
how can A(B) verify that the results provided by the server are correct;
how can A (B) be sure that the server does not violate its privacy accessing
to its personal data.
The solutions that we will study in this work therefore aims to answer the above
questions. More specifically, they aim to obtain the following two main properties:
1. privacy, meaning that the server should not learn information about the user
data as the data might be sensitive (e.g. credit cards, medical records, etc.)
and A would like to keep them private;
2. integrity, meaning that S must not be able to send incorrect results to A (B).
Actually, the proposed solution will guarantee also other properties:
(a) security, meaning that S should be able to “prove” the correctness of the
delegated computation for some program P ;
(b) e ciency, meaning that A (B) should be able to check the proof by re-
quiring significantly fewer resources than those needed to compute P ;
(c) unbounded storage, meaning that the size of the outsourced data should
not be fixed a priori, i.e., A should be able to outsource any (possibly
growing) amount of data;
(d) program-independence, meaning that A should be able to outsource its
data without having to know in advance the functions that it will delegate
later.
In the next sections, we will examine some possible approaches to achieve these
goals, showing, in order, how to obtain only integrity (see Sec. 2.3 ), only privacy
(see Sec. 2.4 ) or integrity and privacy ( Sec. 2.5).
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2.3 An approach to solve integrity
Someone might be tempted to solve the integrity problem ( 2 ) by using standard
cryptographic tool like digital signatures. Using digital signatures, the user A can
outsource its data m1, ...,mn to the cloud server S signing each of them, and later
A can ask the server to run a program P over the outsourced data (m1, ...,mn).
The server computes P(m1, ...,mn) and sends the result m to A. The problem is
that A wants to be sure that m
?
= P(m1, ...,mn) and that the server applied P
on its data. To this end, S could send back to A the original data with all the
signatures giving to A the chance to verify the result by recomputing P(m1, ...,mn).
Clearly, this is not an e cient solution because to obtain a simple result, the server
has to send back an entire portion of the database, A should store it and redo the
computation (whereas this is the reason for which it is paying the cloud provider).
This simple example shows that a standard cryptographic tool cannot help A. In
the next section we will present a more advanced cryptographic technique that can
be employed to solve the integrity problem in this scenario.
2.3.1 Homomorphic message authenticators with e cient
verification
There exists a huge and fervent research field, called Verifiable computation (VC)
that deals with the problem of securely and e ciently outsourcing the computation
of a function f to a remote server.
1 Verifiable computing (or verified computation or verified computing) is enabling
a computer to o✏oad the computation of some function to other perhaps untrusted
clients, while maintaining verifiable results. The other clients evaluate the function
and return the result with a proof that the computation of the function was carried
out correctly. The term “verifiable computing” was formalized by Rosario Gennaro,
Craig Gentry, and Bryan Parno [14]. Verifiable computing is not only concerned
with getting the result of the outsourced function on the client’s input and the
proof of its correctness, but also with the client being able to verify the proof with
significantly less computational e↵ort than computing the function from scratch.
Most of the work on VC is only concerned with verifying the correctness of
function’s outputs while knowing the input. The problem of VC when the input is
stored at the server has been addressed by the recent work of M. Backes, D. Fiore
and R. M. Reischuk [3]. In [3] they proposed the first practical protocol that achieves
all the goals stated in Sec. 2.2 except for privacy. The protocol of [3] allows a client
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verifiable_computing.
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to (continuously) store a large amount of data D = D1, D2, D3... on the server, and
then, at certain points in time, to request the computation of a function f on (a
portion of) the outsourced data, e.g., v = f(Di1, ..., Din). Using their protocol, the
server sends to the client a short piece of information vouching for the correctness
of v. The client checks this proof to verify the result of the computation.
The protocol achieves an additional property, namely the input-independent ef-
ficiency property, meaning that verifying the correctness of a computation f(D1,
D2, D3, ..., Dn) requires time independent of n. Such property is guaranteed in the
amortized model : after a single precomputation with cost |f |, the client can verify
every subsequent evaluation of f in constant time, i.e., regardless of the input size
n on his data.
Their key technical contribution was the introduction of homomorphic MACs
with e cient verification. This cryptographic primitive extends homomorphic mes-
sage authenticators [15] by adding a crucial e ciency property for the verification
algorithm. They proposed a first realization of homomorphic MACs with e cient
verification, proving its security under the Decision Linear assumption [6].
The basic idea of homomorphic MACs is that a user can use a secret key to
generate a set of tags  1, ...,  n authenticating values D1, ..., Dn respectively. Then,
anyone can homomorphically execute a function f over ( 1, ...,  n) to generate a
short tag   that authenticates D as the output of f(D1, ..., Dn).
At first glance, homomorphic MACs seem to perfectly fit the problem of verifiable
computations on (growing) outsourced data. However, this primitive reveals that
this idea lacks the very important property of e cient verification. The issue is that
in all existing constructions the verification algorithm of homomorphic MACs runs
in time proportional to the description of the function.
In [3] their contribution was therefore to solve this e ciency issue by proposing
a definition and a first practical realization of homomorphic MACs with e cient
verification. In the following section we present a formal model and definitions for
this notion. Most of the definitions are taken from [3].
The model: multi-labeled programs
The basic idea behind the model is to introduce the notion of a multi-label L to
authenticate a value m; the intention is to uniquely remember the outsourced data.
A multi-label L consists of two parts: a data set identifier   and an input
identifier ⌧ . Input identifiers, in isolation, are used to label the variable inputs of
a function f , whereas the combination of both, i.e., the full multi-label L = ( , ⌧),
is used to uniquely identify a specific data item. Precisely, binding a value m with
multi-label ( , ⌧) means that m can be assigned to those input variables with input
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identifier ⌧ . Indeed, one cannot re-use a pair ( , ⌧) for authentication purposes but
can re-use the input identifier ⌧ . For the sake of illustration, consider the multi-
labeled approach as a separation of data items into two independent dimensions.
One might think of a database table ( Fig. 2.1 ), e.g., storing blood oxygen levels,
where some function f : Mn ! M is evaluated over n rows (labeled ⌧1, ..., ⌧n).
Each such row could represent a point in time, e.g., 7:05, 07:10, etc. These rows
are grouped into many groups and each group could represent a di↵erent day, e.g.,
2015/06/20, 2015/06/21, etc. ( Fig. 2.2 ). The computation is performed for a
group of rows (labeled  i) of the table. We hence evaluate f i(⌧1, ..., ⌧n) for each
group of rows i, hence for each day.
Figure 2.1: Example of a table structure in the multi-label model.
Figure 2.2: Multi-label model.
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In order to define the notion of multi-labeled program, it is necessary to review
the notion of labeled program introduced in [15] for the case of Boolean circuits
f : {0,1}n ! {0,1}, here generalizing it to the case of any function f defined over
an appropriate set M.
Labeled Programs. A labeled program P is defined by a tuple (f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n)
where f : Mn ! M is a function on n variables, and each ⌧i 2 {0, 1}⇤ is the
label of the i-th variable input of f . Labeled programs allow for composition as
follows. Given labeled programs P1, ...,Pt and given a function g : Mt !M, the
composed program P⇤ corresponds to evaluating g on the outputs of P1, ...,Pt. The
composed program is compactly denoted as P⇤ = g(P1, ...,Pt). The labeled inputs
of P⇤ are all distinct labeled inputs of P1, ...,Pt, i.e., all inputs with the same label
are grouped together in a single input of the new program. If fid : M !M is the
canonical identity function2 and ⌧ 2 {0, 1}⇤ is a label, then I⌧ = (fid, ⌧) denotes the
identity program for input label ⌧ . Notice that any program P = (f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n) can
be expressed as the composition of n identity programs P = f(I⌧1 , ..., I⌧n).
Multi-labeled Programs. Formally, a multi-labeled program P  is defined
as a pair (P , ) where P = (f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n) is a labeled program (as defined above) and
  2 {0, 1}⇤ is a binary string called the data set identifier. Multi-labeled programs
allow for composition within the same data set in the most natural way, i.e., given
multi-labeled programs (P1, ), ..., (Pt, ) having the same data set identifier  ,
and given a function g : Mt !M, the composed multi-labeled program P⇤  is the
pair (P⇤, ) where P⇤ is the composed program g(P1, ...,Pt), and   is the data
set identifier shared by all the Pi. If fid : M ! M is the canonical identity
function and L = ( , ⌧) 2 ({0, 1}⇤)2 is a multi-label, then IL = (fid, L) denotes
the identity multi-labeled program for data set   and input label ⌧ . As for labeled
programs, any multi-labeled program P  = ((f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n), ) can also be expressed
as the composition of n identity multi-labeled programs: P  = f(IL1 , ..., ILn) where
Li = ( , ⌧i).
The main di↵erence in a multi-labeled program is the (explicit) notion of labeled
data sets that it is used in order to group together several inputs. This explicit
splitting will turn out to be crucial in order to achieve the desired property of
e cient verification.
2In mathematics, an identity function, also called an identity relation or identity map or identity
transformation, is a function that always returns the same value that was used as its argument.
In equations, the function is given by f(x) = x.
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Homomorphic message authenticators for multi-labeled programs
Definition 2.1 A homomorphic message authenticator scheme HomMAC ML for
multi-label programs is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen,Auth,Ver,Eval) satisfying four
properties: authentication correctness, evaluation correctness, succinctness, and se-
curity. More precisely:
KeyGen(1 )! (ek, sk): given the security parameter  , the key generation algorithm
outputs a secret key sk and a public evaluation key ek.
Auth(sk, L,m)!  : given the secret key sk, a multi-label L = ( , ⌧) and a message
m 2 M, it outputs a tag  .
Eval(ek, f, )!  : on input the evaluation key ek, a circuit f : Mn ! M and a
vector of tags   = ( 1,...,  n), the evaluation algorithm outputs a new tag  .
Ver(sk,P ,m,  )! 0/1: given the secret key sk, a multi-labeled program P  =
((f , ⌧1, ..., ⌧n),  ), a message m 2M, and a tag  , the verification algorithm
outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Authentication Correctness. Informally speaking, a homomorphic MAC has
authentication correctness if any tag   generated by the algorithm Auth(sk, L,m)
authenticates m with respect to the identity program IL. More formally, we say
that a scheme HomMAC ML satisfies authentication correctness if for any message
m 2M, all keys (sk, ek)  R KeyGen(1 ), any multi-label L = ( , ⌧) 2 ({0, 1}⇤)2,
and any tag    R Auth(sk, L,m), we have that Ver(sk, IL,m,  ) = 1 holds with
probability 1.
Evaluation Correctness. This property aims at capturing that if the evalu-
ation algorithm is run on a vector of tags   = ( 1, ...,  n) such that each  i au-
thenticates some message mi as the output of a multi-labeled program (Pi, ),
then the tag   produced by Eval must authenticate f(m1, ...,mn) as the output of
the composed program (f(P1, ...,Pn), ). More formally, let us fix a pair of keys
(sk, ek)  R KeyGen(1 ), a function g : Mt ! M and any set of message/pro-
gram/tag triples {(mi,P ,i,  i)}ti=1 such that all multi-labeled programs P ,i =
(Pi, ) (i.e., sharing the same data set identifier  ) and Ver(sk,P ,i,mi,  i) = 1.
If m⇤ = g(m1, ...,mt),P⇤ = g(P1, ...,Pt), and  ⇤ = Eval(ek, g, ( 1, ...,  t)), then
Ver(sk,P⇤ ,m⇤,  ⇤) = 1 holds with probability 1.
Succinctness. The size of a tag is bounded by some fixed polynomial in the
security parameter, which is independent of the number n of inputs taken by the
evaluated circuit.
Security. A homomorphic MAC has to satisfy the following notion of unforge-
ability. Let HomMAC ML be a homomorphic MAC scheme as defined above and
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let A be an adversary. HomMAC ML is said to be unforgeable if for every PPT
adversary. A, we have Pr[HomUF  CMAA,HomMAC ML( ) = 1]  ✏( ) where ✏( )
is a negligible function. The experiment HomUF  CMAA,HomMAC ML( ) is the one
defined below.
Setup The challenger generates (sk, ek) R KeyGen(1 ) and gives ek to A.
Authentication queries The adversary can adaptively ask for tags on multi-
labels and messages of its choice. Given a query (L,m) where L = ( , ⌧), the
challenger proceeds as follows: If (L,m) is the first query with data set identifier
 , then the challenger initializes an empty list T  = ; for data set identifier  . If
T  does not contain a tuple (⌧, ·) (i.e., the multi-label ( , ⌧) was never queried),
the challenger computes    R Auth(sk, L,m), returns   to A and updates the list
T   T  [ (⌧,m). If (⌧,m) 2 T  (i.e., the query was previously made), then the
challenger replies with the same tag generated before. If T  contains a tuple (⌧,m0)
for some message m0 /= m, then the challenger ignores the query.
Verification queries The adversary has access to a verification oracle as fol-
lows: Given a query (P ,m,  ) from A, the challenger replies with the output of
Ver(sk,P ,m,  ).
Forgery The adversary terminates the experiment by returning a forgery (P⇤ ⇤ ,
m⇤,  ⇤) for some P⇤ ⇤ = (P⇤, ⇤) and P⇤ = (f ⇤, ⌧ ⇤1 ,...,⌧ ⇤n). Notice that, equivalently,
A can implicitly return such a tuple as a verification query (P⇤ ⇤ ,m⇤,  ⇤) during the
experiment.
Before describing the outcome of this experiment, it is necessary to review the
notion of well-defined programs with respect to a list T  [9]. A labeled program P⇤
= (f ⇤, ⌧ ⇤1 ,..., ⌧
⇤
n) is well-defined with respect to T ⇤ if either one of the following two
cases holds:
- there exist messages m1, ..., mn such that the list T ⇤ contains all tuples (⌧ ⇤1 ,
m1),... ,(⌧ ⇤n, mn). Intuitively, this means that the entire input space of f for data
set  ⇤ has been authenticated;
- there exist indices i 2 {1,... , n} such that (⌧ ⇤i , ·) /2 T ⇤ (i.e., A never asked au-
thentication queries with multi-label ( ⇤, ⌧ ⇤i )), and the function f
⇤({mj}(⌧j ,mj)2T ⇤
[{m˜j}(⌧j ,·)/2T ⇤ ) outputs the same value for all possible choices of m˜j 2 M. In-
tuitively, this case means that the unauthenticated inputs never contribute to the
computation of f .
To define the output of the experiment HomUF  CMA, we said it outputs 1 if
and only if Ver(sk,P⇤ ⇤ , m⇤,  ⇤) = 1 and one of the following conditions holds:
Type 1 Forgery: no list T ⇤ was created during the game, i.e., no message
m has been authenticated with respect to a data set identifier  ⇤ during the
experiment;
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Type 2 Forgery: P⇤ is well-defined w.r.t. T ⇤ and m⇤ /= f ⇤({mj}(⌧j ,mj)2T ⇤ ),
i.e., m⇤ is not the correct output of the labeled program P⇤ when executed on
previously authenticated messages (m1,..., mn);
Type 3 Forgery: P⇤ is not well-defined w.r.t. T ⇤ .
This definition is obtained by extending the one in [9] to the model of multi-
labeled programs. The resulting definition is very close to the one proposed by
Freeman for homomorphic signatures [13], with the exception that they allow for
arbitrary labels, and they do not impose any a-priori fixed bound on the number of
elements in a data set. In the most general case where f can be any function, it might
not be possible to e ciently (i.e., in polynomial time) check whether a program P
is well-defined w.r.t. a list T . However, for more specific classes of computations,
this is not an issue. In the following proposition it is showna similar result for the
classes of computations considered in [3], i.e., arithmetic circuits defined over the
finite field Zp where p is a prime of roughly   bits, and whose degree d is bounded by
a polynomial. In particular, they showed that any adversary who wins by producing
a Type 3 forgery can be converted into one who outputs a Type 2 forgery.
Just for completeness, we give the following proposition whose proof appears in
[3].
Proposition 2.1 Let   2 N be the security parameter, let p > 2  be a prime
number, and let {f } be a family of arithmetic circuits over Zp whose degree is
bounded by some polynomial d = poly( ). If for any adversary B producing a Type
2 forgery we have that Pr[HomUF  CMAB,HomMAC ML( ) = 1]  ✏, then for any
adversary A producing a Type 3 forgery it holds Pr[HomUF  CMAA,HomMAC ML( ) =
1]  ✏ + d/p.
Homomorphic message authenticators with e cient verification for multi-
labeled programs
In this section it is introduced the new property of e cient verification for homo-
morphic MACs. Informally, a homomorphic MAC satisfies e cient verification if
it is possible to verify a tag   against a multi-labeled program P  = (P ,  ) in
less time than that required to compute P . This e ciency property is defined in an
amortized sense, so that the verification is more e cient when the same program P
is executed on di↵erent data sets. The formal definition follows.
Definition 2.2 Let HomMAC ML = (KeyGen, Auth, Ver, Eval) be a homomor-
phic MAC scheme for multi-labeled programs as defined in the previous section.
HomMAC ML satisfies e cient verification if there exist two additional algorithms
(VerPrep, E↵Ver) as follows :
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VerPrep(sk,P)! VKP : on input the secret key sk and a labeled program P = (f, ⌧1,
..., ⌧n), this algorithm generates a concise verification key VKP . We stress that
this verification key does not depend on any data set identifier  .
E↵Ver(sk,VKP , ,m,  )! 0/1: given the secret key sk, a verification key VKP , a
data set identifier  , a message m 2 M and a tag  , the e cient verification
algorithm outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
The above algorithms are required to satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness. Let (sk, ek) R KeyGen(1 ) be honestly generated keys, and (P ,
m,  ) be any program/message/tag tuple with P  = (P ,  ) such that Ver(sk,P ,
m,  ) = 1. Then, for every VKP  R VerPrep(sk,P), we have Pr[E↵Ver(sk, VKP ,  ,
m,  ) = 1] = 1.
Amortized e ciency. Let P  = (P ,  ) be a program, let (m1, ..., mn) 2
Mn be any vector of inputs, and let t(n) be the time required to compute P(m1,
..., mn). If VKP  R VerPrep(sk,P), then the time required for E↵Ver(sk, VKP ,  ,
m,  ) is O(1), i.e., independent of n.
Notice that in this e ciency requirement, it is not included the time needed to
compute VKP . The reason is, since VKP is independent of  , the same VKP can
be re-used in many verifications involving the same labeled program P but many
di↵erent  . In this sense, the cost of computing VKP is amortized over many
verifications of the same function on di↵erent data sets.
Application to Verifiable Computation on Outsourced Data.
A homomorphic MAC scheme with e cient verification can be easily used to ob-
tain a protocol for verifiable delegation of computations on outsourced data, achiev-
ing goals ( 2.a - 2.d) mentioned in Sec. 2.2. A sketch of such a protocol between a
client C and a server S follows:
Setup: C generates the keys (sk, ek)  R KeyGen(1 ) for a homomorphic MAC,
sends ek to S and stores sk.
Data Outsourcing: to outsource a value m, C first authenticates m wrt. some
multi-label L, i.e.,    R Auth(sk, L, m), and then sends (m, L,  ) to the server.
It is easy to see that this phase achieves the goal of unbounded storage ( 2.c) and
function independence ( 2.d).
Client’s Preparation: assume that C needs to evaluate a labeled program P =
(f , ⌧1, ..., ⌧n) on some of its outsourced data sets. In this preparation phase (o✏ine),
the client computes and stores VKP  RVerPrep(sk,P) (independently of any  ).
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Delegation: when the client wants to compute P on a data set   (online), it
simply sends (P ,  ) to the server 3.
Computation: to compute (P ,  ), where P = (f , ⌧1, ..., ⌧n), the server first
looks for the corresponding data (m1, ..., mn) and tags ( 1, ...,  n) according to
the labeling previously sent by C. Next, S computes m = f(m1, ..., mn) and
   Eval(ek, f,  1, ...,  n), and sends (m,  ) to C.
Verification: given the result (m,  ) sent by S, the client checks that m is the
correct output of the multi-labeled program (P ,  ) by running E↵Ver(sk,VKP ,  ,
m,  ). By the amortized e ciency property of the homomorphic MAC, we obtain
that C achieves amortized input-independent e ciency - and thus also e ciency
( 2.b) - in verifying the delegated computations.
Fig.2.3 shows a graphic sketch of the previous protocol.
Figure 2.3: Protocol for verifiable delegation of computations on outsourced data
using a homomorphic MAC scheme with e cient verification.
3 While in general the description of P may be large, here we assume the case in which P has
a succinct description, e.g., “daily variance of the air pollution levels at every 5 minutes”. Hence,
the cost of communicating P can, in fact, be ignored.
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2.4 An approach to solve privacy
Now we turn to the problem of achieving privacy when delegating computation.
In Sec. 2.3 we have seen how a standard cryptographic tool such as digital
signatures can not solve the integrity problem. Here we briefly show how again
another standard cryptographic tool, such as encryption, cannot help to solve the
privacy issue.
Let’s consider the same initial example of the medical data. Someone might be
tempted to solve the privacy problem by using (standard) encryption: in order to
prevent leakage of sensitive information to the cloud service provider, the user A first
encrypts the data to produce ciphertexts. He then uploads the ciphertexts to the
cloud server S (probably without having to keep a copy of the data due to its limited
local storage capacity). When, later, A wishes to derive some information from its
data, such as the presence of a disease, it sends an instruction to S, specifying a
program P to be executed on his data.
Now, S is not able to read the encrypted data and it can carry on the computation
only having the A’s secret key. A possible solution could be that S sends the
ciphertexts back to A so that it could compute P by itself. Once again, this is not
an e cient solution because to obtain a simple result, S has to send back a huge
amount of data and the client has to store them, decrypt them and then make the
computation. Even in this case, a standard cryptographic tool cannot be of help.
As we show in the next section, the question about how to solve privacy in this
setting, can be solved in principle with a very powerful cryptographic tool that is
called Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).
2.4.1 Fully homomorphic encryption
FHE is a public key encryption scheme, defined as usual, by a key generation algo-
rithm, an encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm, but with the addition
of a new algorithm, the evaluation algorithm. Such algorithm has the capability to
execute a function f over ciphertexts in such a way that what one obtains is another
ciphertext; this ciphertext, when decrypted, gives the output of the function over
the original data. In this sense the scheme is homomorphic, because when one oper-
ates over the ciphertexts (that are encodings of the inputs) is like one is performing
the same operation homomorphically on the original inputs.
As usually, we want that a FHE scheme must be secure, in particular it should
satisfy the standard notion of semantic security.
Definition 2.3 (Semantic security). Let HE=(KeyGen, Enc, Eval, Dec) be a (ho-
momorphic) encryption scheme, and A be a PPT adversary. Consider the following
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experiment:
Experiment ExpSSHE,A( )
b  R {0,1}; (pk, sk)  R KeyGen(1 )
(m0,m1)  A(pk)
c R Enc(pk,mb)
b0  A(c)
If b0 = b return 1. Else return 0.
and define A’s advantage as AdvSSHE,A( )=Pr[ExpSSHE,A( )=1]-12 . Then we say thatHE is semantically-secure if for any PPT algorithm A it holds AdvSSHE,A( )=
negl( ).
So, if FHE gives us semantic security, we achieve privacy, while e ciency is
guaranteed by another property of HE called compactness, that basically means
that the ciphertext is not growing with the complexity of the function. Program
independence is also guaranteed by the definition (when you are encrypting the
plaintext you are not specifying any function).
While the first FHE scheme proposed by Gentry in 2009 ([16]) basically consisted
of theoretical proofs of concepts and was not practical, in the recent years there have
been significant advances ([7], [8]).
In what follows we recall the formal definitions of FHE.
Formally, a fully homomorphic (public-key) encryption (FHE) scheme is a tu-
ple of PPT algorithms FHE = (FHE.ParamGen, FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Dec,
FHE.Eval) defined as follows.
FHE.ParamGen(1 ) : defines the parameters for the scheme, such as plaintext space
M, ciphertext space, keyspace, randomness distributions, etc. The output of
ParamGen is assumed to be input to any subsequent algorithm.
FHE.KeyGen(1 ) ! (pk, evk, dk) : outputs a public encryption key pk, a public eval-
uation key evk, and a secret decryption key dk.
FHE.Enc(pk,m) ! c : encrypts message m 2M under public key pk. It outputs a
ciphertext c.
FHE.Dec(dk, c) ! m : decrypts the ciphertext c using dk to a plaintext m 2M.
FHE.Eval(evk, g, c1, ..., ct) ! c⇤ : given the evaluation key evk, a circuit g :Mt!
M, and a set of t ciphertexts c1, ..., ct, deterministically compute and output
a ciphertext c⇤.
An FHE should also satisfy the following properties.
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Encryption Correctness. For all m 2M we have:
Pr
h
FHE.Decdk(FHE.Encpk(m)) = m | (pk, evk, dk) FHE.KeyGen( )
i
= 1
Evaluation Correctness. For (pk, evk, dk) FHE.KeyGen( ), any ciphertexts c1,
...,ct such that FHE.Decdk(ci) = mi 2M, and any circuit g :Mt !M, we have
FHE.Decdk(FHE.Evalevk(g, c1, ..., ct)) = g(m1, ...,mt)
Succinctness. The ciphertext size is bounded by some fixed polynomial in the secu-
rity parameter, and is independent of the size of the evaluated circuit or the number
of inputs it takes. I.e. there exists some polynomial p such that, for any (pk, evk, dk)
 FHE.KeyGen( ), the output size of FHE.Encpk and of Evalevk is bounded by p, for
any choice of their inputs.
Semantic security. An FHE is a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme,
where we consider the evaluation key evk as a part of the public key. I.e. for any
PPT attacker A:
|Pr[A( , pk, evk, c0) = 1]  Pr[A( , pk, evk, c1) = 1]|  negl( )
where the probability is over (pk, evk, dk)  FHE.KeyGen( ), cb  FHE.Encpk(mb),
m0,m1  M, and the coins of A.
2.5 An approach to solve integrity and privacy
Summarizing, in the two previous sections we have seen the Homomorphic MACs
as possible solution to solve the integrity problem without guaranteeing privacy
(the fact that the server sends the correct result does not prevent the server to
learn information about the client data) and FHE as possible solution to solve the
privacy issue without guaranteeing integrity (the fact that the server operates over
encrypted data does not prevent the server to cheat, sending incorrect results).
A possible solution that aims to guarantee integrity and privacy has been recently
proposed by D. Fiore, R. Gennaro and V. Pastro in [12]. The authors, in [12],
studied the task of verifiable delegation on encrypted data. They improved previous
definitions by adding verification queries. Their contribution was:
theoretical, with the definition of a generic VC scheme with privacy in the
presence of verification queries and with the generic construction of a scheme
to obtain “integrity and privacy” for arbitrary computations;
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practical, with the constructions of highly e cient schemes for delegation of
various classes of specific functions with applications, i.e. verifiable statistics
(average, variance, covariance, correlation error, etc.) and distance measures
over encrypted data.
In the next chapter, using as starting point the article of [12], we present our
new theoretical contribution, showing a generic and flexible model for representing
secure outsourcing schemes.
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Chapter 3
A unifying model for secure
outsourcing
We concluded the previous chapter seeing that new interesting research works are
trying to solve the problem of achieving both integrity and privacy.
Following the ideas present in one of these recent works ([12]), our contribution
is:
1. theoretical, with the definition of an Outsourcing scheme (see Sec. 3.1 and Sec.
3.2 ) that aims to provide a flexible and generic model to allow the outsourcing
of data on a remote server and the delegation of a computation over such data.
Starting from the VC scheme of [12] we have studied new definitions in order
to capture the case in which one wants only privacy, only integrity or both;
the new Outsourcing scheme is a re-elaborated version of the VC scheme of
[12] adapted to the multi-labeled model presented in Sec. 2.3.1.2;
2. practical (see Sec. 3.3), with the redefinition of one of the e cient schemes
proposed in [12] using the new theoretical construction of the previous point;
even in this case, starting from the scheme in [12], we have re-elaborate it
using the definitions of our new Outsourcing scheme.
3.1 The Outsourcing scheme
An Outsourcing scheme is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Encode, Compute, Decode)
satisfying five properties: encoding correctness, computing correctness, succinctness,
security and privacy.
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KeyGen(1 )! (enck, compk, deck): given the security parameter  , the key genera-
tion algorithm outputs an encoding key enck, a computing key compk and a
decoding key deck.
Encode(enck, L,m)!  m: given the encoding key enck, a multi-label L = ( , ⌧) and
a message m 2 M, it outputs an encoding  m which is given to the server to
compute with.
Compute(compk, f, )!  y: on input the computing key compk, a function f :
Mn ! M and a vector of encodings   = ( m1 , ...,  mn), the server com-
putes an encoded version,  y, of the function’s output y = f(m1, ..., mn).
Decode(deck,P ,  y)! (acc, y): given the decoding key deck, a multi-labeled pro-
gram P  = ((f , ⌧1, ..., ⌧n),  ), and the tag  y, the decoding algorithm converts
the server’s output into a bit acc and a message y. If acc = 1 we say the client
accepts y = P (m1, ..., mt), if acc = 0 we say the client rejects.
A discussion on the Outsourcing scheme model
At a glance, this new model could appear just as an improved copy of the Ho-
momorphic MACs for Multi-Labeled Programs ( Sec. 2.3.1.2 ) with the addition of
the privacy property (shown below) and the modification of the algorithms names.
Actually, it shows very interesting characteristics that maybe could not seem clear
at this point, but that will be clearer in the next chapters, especially when it will be
presented the framework to implement such model and some related applications.
How was this scheme born? In this chapter we have seen two possible solutions
to solve the integrity and privacy problems in the scenario in which one wants to
outsource some data on a remote server and then delegate a computation over such
data. The idea has been to create a model that incorporated all such solutions
giving the possibility to choose from time to time the desired property (integrity,
privacy or both). Namely, if we need integrity and we have a VC scheme based on
the definition of Homomorphic MACs for Multi-Labeled Programs ( Sec. 2.3.1.2 )
we can use the Outsourcing scheme to model such VC scheme; if we need privacy
and we have a homomorphic encryption scheme, we can use the Outsourcing scheme
to model such encryption scheme; if finally, we need privacy and integrity, we can
again use the Outsourcing and we will see how.
This idea is strictly related to the choice of the algorithms names. In the multi-
labeled model( Sec. 2.3.1.2 ), they were KeyGen, Auth standing for authentication,
Eval standing for evaluation and Ver standing for verification.
If one wants to be coherent with the idea presented above, it is obvious that these
names are no longer correct because when one speaks about encryption, usually
one refers to encryption or decryption algorithms, and not to authentication or
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verification algorithms. Of course it is di cult to find names whose meanings well
map for both encryption and verifiable computation; for this reason they have been
chosen generic names somehow wrappers. We have chosen the names of Encode,
Compute and Decode; essentially, the therm encode represents the idea to “convert”
a message (or a generic information) into something that could be, for example,
a ciphertext if one is working with encryption, or maybe an authentication tag
if one is working with verifiable computation using homomorphic MACs; in other
words, an encoding operation returns a piece of information that is what is given
to the untrusted cloud. The same consideration is valid for the therm decode that
represents the operation to restore the original value of something; operation that
can be a simple decryption or a verification, according to the application context.
Regarding the compute word, it has been chosen because, apart from the context,
this algorithm implies always a computation, whatsoever nature it is. Finally, the
KeyGen algorithm is always present and the name is appropriate for each setting.
The main properties defined in Sec. 2.3.1.2 are here redefined, while the new
privacy property is introduced, again in the presence of encoding and “decoding”
queries by the adversary.
Encoding Correctness. Informally speaking, an Outsourcing scheme has en-
coding correctness if any tag  mi generated by the algorithm Encode(enck, Li,mi)
encodes mi with respect to the identity multi-labeled program ILi . More for-
mally, we say that an Outsourcing scheme satisfies encoding correctness if for any
message m 2 M, all keys (enck, compk, deck)  R KeyGen(1 ), any multi-label
L = ( , ⌧) 2 ({0, 1}⇤)2, and any tag  m  R Encode(enck, L,m), we have that
Decode(deck, IL,  ) = (1,m) holds with probability 1.
Computation Correctness. This property aims at capturing that if the com-
putation algorithm is run on a vector of encodings   = ( 1, ...,  n) such that each
 i encodes some message mi as the output of a multi-labeled program (Pi, ), then
the encoding   produced by Compute must authenticate f(m1, ...,mn) as the out-
put of the composed program (f(P1, ...,Pn), ). More formally, let us fix a tuple
of keys (enck, compk, deckk)  R KeyGen(1 ), a function g : Mt ! M and any
set of message/program/encoding triples {(mi,P ,i,  yi)}ti=1 such that all multi-
labeled programs P ,i = (Pi, ) (i.e., share the same data set identifier  ) and
Decode(deck,P ,i, yi) = (1,mi). If m⇤ = g(m1, ...mn), P⇤ = g(P1, ...,Pt), and
 ⇤y = Compute(compk, f, ( 1, ...,  t)), then (Decode(deck,P⇤ ,  ⇤y) = (1,m⇤) holds
with probability 1.
Succinctness. The size of an encoding is bounded by some fixed polynomial in
the security parameter, which is independent of the number n of inputs taken by
the evaluated circuit.
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Security. An Outsourcing scheme has to satisfy the following notion of un-
forgeability. Let Outsourcing be a scheme as defined above and let A be an ad-
versary. Outsourcing is said to be unforgeable if for every PPT adv. A, we have
Pr[OutsourcingUF  CMAA,Outsourcing( ) = 1]  ✏( ) where ✏( ) is a negligible func-
tion. The experiment OutsourcingUF  CMAA,Outsourcing( ) is the one defined below.
Setup The challenger generates (enck, compk, deck)  R KeyGen(1 ) and gives pk
to A.
Encoding queries The adversary can adaptively ask for encodings on multi-labels
and messages of its choice. Given a query (L,m) where L = ( , ⌧), the challenger
proceeds as follows: If (L,m) is the first query with data set identifier  , then
the challenger initializes an empty list T  = ; for data set identifier  . If T 
does not contain a tuple (⌧, ·) (i.e., the multi-label ( , ⌧) was never queried), the
challenger computes  m  R Encode(enck, L,m), returns  m to A and updates the
list T   T [ (⌧,m). If (⌧,m) 2 T  (i.e., the query was previously made), then the
challenger replies with the same encoding generated before. If T  contains a tuple
(⌧,m0) for some message m0 /= m, then the challenger ignores the query.
Decoding queries The adversary has access to a decoding oracle as follows: given
a query (P ,  ) from A, the challenger replies with only the acceptance bit of the
output of Decode(sk,P ,  ).
Forgery The adversary terminates the experiment by returning a forgery (P⇤ ⇤ , ⇤)
for some P⇤ ⇤ = (P⇤, ⇤) and P⇤ = (f ⇤, ⌧ ⇤1 ,...,⌧ ⇤n). Notice that, equivalently, A can
implicitly return such a tuple as a verification query (P⇤ ⇤ ,  ⇤) during the experiment.
The following steps are almost equal to those in Sec. 2.3.1.2; therefore the reader
can refer to such section to review the notion of well-defined programs with respect
to a list T .
To define the output of the experiment OutsourcingUF  CMA, we said it outputs
1 if and only if Decode(deck,P⇤ ⇤ ,  ⇤) = (1, y⇤) ^ y⇤ /= P⇤ ⇤(m1, ...,mn) and one of
the following conditions holds:
Type 1 Forgery: no list T ⇤ was created during the game, i.e., no message
m has been authenticated with respect to a data set identifier  ⇤ during the
experiment;
Type 2 Forgery: P⇤ is well-defined w.r.t. T ⇤ and m⇤ /= f ⇤({mj}(⌧j ,mj)2T ⇤ ),
i.e., m⇤ is not the correct output of the labeled program P⇤ when executed on
previously authenticated messages (m1, . . . , mn);
Type 3 Forgery: P⇤ is not well-defined w.r.t. T ⇤ .
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As already done in Sec. 2.3.1.2, we provide the following proposition equivalent
to the Prop. 2.1 but here adapted to the new model, presenting only the statement.
The proof traces that of the Prop. 2.1.
Proposition 2.2 Let   2 N be the security parameter, let p > 2  be a prime
number, and let {f } be a family of arithmetic circuits over Zp whose degree is
bounded by some polynomial d = poly( ). If for any adversary B producing a Type
2 forgery we have that Pr[OutsourcingUF  CMAB,Outsourcing( ) = 1]  ✏, then for any
adversary A producing a Type 3 forgery it holds Pr[OutsourcingUF  CMAA,Outsourcing( )
= 1]  ✏ + d/p.
Now it is the moment to present the real new contribute of the model, i.e. the
privacy property. Again, it is described through a game between an honest challenger
and an adversary. We stress that this property is still valid in presence of encoding
and decoding queries; basically it is an extension of the usually semantic security
notion, just embedded in this new model.
Privacy is defined based on a typical indistinguishability argument that guaran-
tees that no information about the inputs is leaked.
Intuitively, an Outsourcing scheme is private when the public outputs of the en-
coding algorithm Encode over two di↵erent inputs are indistinguishable (i.e., nobody
can decide which encoding is the correct one for a given input).
Privacy. An Outsourcing scheme has to satisfy the following notion of privacy.
Let Outsourcing be a scheme as defined above and let A be an adversary. Outsourcing
is said to be private if for every PPT adversaryA, we have Pr[PrOutsourcingA,Outsourcing( )
= 1]  1/2 + ✏( ) where ✏( ) is a negligible function. The experiment
PrOutsourcingPRA,Outsourcing( ) is the one defined below.
The Setup step, the Encoding queries, the Decoding queries and the
Forgery are the same of the security experiment described before.
Challenge The adversary selects two inputs m0, m1 of its choice. The challenger
randomly selects b  R {0,1} and then gives to the adversary the encoding of the
randomly selected one of the two inputs, mb. The adversary must guess which one
was encoded.
To define the output of the experiment, we say that the adversary A outputs b0,
and the experiment outputs 1 if and only if b0 = b.
3.1.1 Outsourcing schemes with e cient decoding
The next step is to define the meaning of e ciency for the Outsourcing scheme.
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As for the homomorphic MAC for multi-labeled programs, an Outsourcing scheme
satisfies the e ciency property if it possible to decode an encoding   against a multi-
labeled program P  = (P , ) in less time than that required to compute P . Again,
this e ciency property is possible in the amortized sense exploiting the concept of
multi-label; indeed the decoding is more e cient if the same program P is executed
over di↵erent data sets.
Definition 2.3 Let Outsourcing = (KeyGen, Encode, Compute, Decode) be a scheme
as defined previously. Outsourcing satisfies the e ciency property if there exist two
additional algorithms (O✏ineDecode, OnlineDecode) working as follows :
O✏ineDecode(deck,P)! OnDKP : on input the decoding key deck and a labeled
program P = (f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n), this algorithm generates a concise online decoding
key OnDKP . We stress that this online decoding key does not depend on any
data set identifier  .
OnlineDecode(deck,OnDKP , ,  y): given the decoding key deck, an online decoding
key OnDKP , a data set identifier   and a tag  y, the e cient decoding algo-
rithm outputs an acceptance bit acc and a message y. If acc = 1 we say the
client accepts y = P (m1, ..., mn), if acc = 0 we say the client rejects.
The above algorithms are required to satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness. Let (enck, compk, deck)  R KeyGen(1 ) be honestly generated
keys, and (P   s) be any program/encoding pair with P  = (P ,  ) such that
Decode(deck,P ,  s) = (1, y) with y = P (m1, ...,mn). Then, for every OnDKP  R
O✏ineDecode(deck,P), we have Pr[OnlineDecode(deck,OnDKP , , s) = 1] = 1.
Amortized e ciency. Let P  = (P ,  ) be a program, let (m1, ..., mn) 2Mn
be any vector of inputs, and let t(n) be the time required to compute P(m1, ..., mn).
If OnDKP  R O✏ineDecode(deck,P), then the time required for OnlineDecode(deck,
OnDKP ,  , s) is O(1), i.e., independent of n.
As already mentioned for the homomorphic MAC for multi-labeled programs, notice
that in this e ciency requirement, it is not included the time needed to compute
OnDKP . The reason is, since OnDKP is independent of  , the same OnDKP can be
re-used in many decodings involving the same labeled program P but many di↵erent
 . In this sense, the cost of computing OnDKP is amortized over many decodings
of the same function on di↵erent data sets.
3.2 A generic construction of the Outsourcing scheme
The goal of this section is to define a generic scheme that, starting from a not private
Outsourcing scheme could provide privacy.
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Let suppose now that we have an Outsourcing scheme like the one described in
the previous section that, however, does not guarantee privacy but allows to solve
integrity and let assume we have also a FHE, that is a tool that allows to solve
privacy. The new question is: can we combine them together in order to obtain a
composition that provides both properties?
A correct and secure answer is achievable following the approach in which one
runs the Outsourcing scheme on top of the FHE scheme.
Informally, in this case to “encode” m you use the Encode method of Outsourcing
over the encryption of m obtained by the Enc algorithm of the FHE scheme. Now,
the encoding  m one obtains is not revealing something about m because it is an
encoding of a ciphertext. The cloud runs the computation algorithm Compute of
Outsourcing over the FHE Eval over f , producing an encoding  s. Fianlly, the Decode
algorithm is also run respect to the FHE Eval over the f , but it is first checked that
 s is correct and only if this test passes then one decrypts; in some sense one will be
sure that what one is decrypting is something that one obtains correctly by applying
the evaluation algorithm of the FHE.
In retrospect, this is a very simple solution because it is a kind of the equivalent
of what do you do in the standard so called Authenticated Encryption ([5]) where
the rule is Encrypt-then-MAC instead of the opposite, while here it is Encrypt-then-
Encode instead of the opposite.
The generic Outsourcing scheme
In this section it is described the generic solution to outsource computation over
encrypted data. It is assumed the existence of a FHE scheme, and a Outsourcing
scheme to outsource the computation of generic functions.
Let FHE = (FHE.ParamGen, FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Dec, FHE.Eval) be an
FHE scheme as defined in Sec. 2.4.1. Also let Outsourcing = (KeyGen, Encode,
Compute, Decode) be a scheme which is correct, secure, and outsourceable, as defined
in Sec. 3.1. In particular note that the Outsourcing scheme does not need to be
private, and that the security is guaranteed in the presence of decoding queries. It
is here described a new scheme PrOutsourcing = (PrKeyGen, PrEncode, PrCompute,
PrDecode) (for private Outsourcing) which uses the above two tools as follows.
PrKeyGen(1 )! (K1,K2):
- Run FHE.KeyGen(1 ) to generate (pk, dk, evk) for FHE.
- Run KeyGen(1 ) to generate the enck, compk, deck for Outsourcing.
- Set K1 = (pk, evk, compk) and K2 = (K1, dk, enck, deck).
PrEncode(K2, L,m)!  m:
- Compute cm = FHE.Enc(pk,m).
26
3 – A unifying model for secure outsourcing
- Run Encode(enck, L, cm) to get  m.
PrCompute(K1, f , )! ( s):
- Run Compute(compk, f ,  ) to compute  s. Note that  s is an encoding of
c⇤ = FHE.Eval(evk, f, ).
PrDecode(K2,P ,  s)! (acc, y):
- Run Decode(deck,P ,  s) to get (acc, c). If acc = 0, reject. If acc = 1,
decrypt y = FHE.Dec(dk, c).
Even in this case, we provide only the statement of the following theorem equiv-
alent to that present in [12], but here adapted to the new model.
Theorem 1. If FHE is a semantically secure FHE, and Outsourcing is a correct,
secure, and outsourceable scheme, then PrOutsourcing is a correct, secure, outsource-
able, and “private” scheme.
3.3 An e cient realization of the Outsourcing scheme:
verifiable computation of linear functions on
encrypted data
The main goals of this thesis is to implement, using the framework that we will
present in the next chapter, one of the e cient schemes conceived in [12] that we re-
elaborated using our new Outsourcing scheme and that we have called Outsourcinglin.
Outsourcinglin (see Sec. 3.3.3 ) allows to compute multi-variate polynomials of
degree 1 over the ring Z2k . In the next sections we will focus on the redefinition of
the scheme in [12] using our new Outsourcing scheme presented in 3.1. To better
understanding the Outsourcinglin scheme, before to define it, we propose a review of
some essential and related mathematical notions, in order to also familiarize with
the notation (see Sec. 3.3.1 ). Later on in the chapter, we will also show the Joye-
Libert cryptoystem (see Sec. 3.3.2 ) that is the homomorphic encryption scheme
employed in the Outsourcinglin scheme.
3.3.1 Some facts of number theory
Quadratic Residues Modulo a Prime
In this section we recall some basic facts of number theory. Most of these def-
initions are taken from [17], where it is also possible to find proofs that here are
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omitted. Considering a group G, an element y of G is a quadratic residue if there
exists an element x of G such that x2 = y. An element that is not a quadratic
residue is called a quadratic non-residue. If we consider the case of G = Z⇤p , the set
of elements from Zp that are relatively prime to p, y is a quadratic residue modulo
p if it is congruent to a perfect square modulo p; i.e, if there exists an x 2 Z⇤p such
that y = x2 mod p.
Proposition 3.1 Let consider a prime p > 2. Every quadratic residue in Z⇤p has
exactly two square roots.
The above proposition implies that half the elements of Z⇤p are quadratic residues.
The set of quadratic residues modulo p is here denoted by QRp , while the set of
quadratic non-residue is here denoted by QNRp. We can also say that, for p > 2
prime
|QRp| = |QNRp| = |Z⇤p|/2 = (p  1)/2
We recall now the Jacobi symbol of x modulo p, Jp(x).
The Jacobi symbol is a generalization of the Legendre symbol. For any integer a
and any positive odd integer n the Jacobi symbol is defined as the product of the
Legendre symbols corresponding to the prime factors of n:⇣a
n
⌘
=
✓
a
p1
◆↵1 ✓ a
p2
◆↵2
...
✓
a
pk
◆↵k
where n = p↵11 p
↵2
2 ... p
↵k
k⇣
a
p
⌘
represents the Legendre symbol, defined for all integers a and all odd primes p
by ✓
a
p
◆
=
8<: 0 if a ⌘ 0 (mod p)+1 if a /⌘ 0 (mod p) and for some integer x,a ⌘ x2 (mod p) 1 if there is no such x
The Legendre and Jacobi symbols are indistinguishable exactly when the lower ar-
gument is an odd prime, in which case they have the same value.
Let consider a prime p > 2, and x 2 Z⇤p. Then
Jp(x) =
⇢
+1 if x is a quadratic residue modulo p
 1 if x is not a quadratic residue modulo p
The notation of Jacobi symbol can be extended for any x relatively prime to p
by defining Jp(x) = Jp([x mod p ]).
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Proposition 3.2 Let consider a prime p > 2. Then Jp(x) = x p 12 .
From the previous proposition we can easily obtain a polynomial-time algorithm
that tells us when a given element x 2 Z⇤p is a quadratic residue and when not.
Algorithm 3.1 Deciding quadratic residuosity modulo a prime
Input Prime p; element x 2 Z⇤p
Output Jp(x)
z := [x
p 1
2 mod p];
if z = 1 return x is a quadratic residue
else return x is a quadratic non-residue
Quadratic Residues Modulo a Composite
Let analyse now the group Z⇤N . We can characterize the quadratic residues mod-
ulo N using the results of the previous section together with the Chinese remainder
theorem: it says that Z⇤N ' Z⇤p⇥Z⇤q and it guarantees a correspondence y $ (yp, yq),
i.e. yp = [y mod p] and yq = [y mod q] .
Proposition 3.3 Let consider N = pq with p, q distinct primes, and let y 2 Z⇤N
with y $ (yp, yq). Then y is a quadratic residue modulo N if and only if yp is a
quadratic residue modulo p and yq is a quadratic residue modulo q.
By using similar observations made for the quadratic residues modulo p, here one
can easily seen that exactly 1/4 of the elements of Z⇤N are quadratic residues. Note
that since y 2 Z⇤N is a quadratic residue if and only if yp, yq are quadratic residues,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between QRN and QRp ⇥ QRq. Thus, the
fraction of quadratic residues modulo N is
|QRN |
|Z⇤N |
=
|QRp| · |QRq|
|Z⇤N |
=
p 1
2 · q 12
(p  1) (q   1) = 1/4
In the previous section, it has been defined the Jacobi symbol Jp(x) for p > 2
prime. We can also define it for the case of N = pq, a product of distinct odd primes
in the following way: for any x relatively prime to N ,
JN(x) = Jp(x) · Jq(x) = Jp([x mod p]) · Jq([x mod q ]):
We refer to J +1N as the set of elements in Z⇤N having Jacobi symbol +1, and to
J  1N as the set of elements in Z⇤N having Jacobi symbol  1.
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Hence, we can also assert that if x is a quadratic residue modulo N , then JN(x) =
+1. If x is a quadratic residue modulo N , then [xmod p] and [xmod q] are quadratic
residues modulo p and q, respectively; this means that Jp(x) = Jq(x) = +1. So
JN(x) = +1.
However, one has to note that JN(x) = +1 it is also possible when Jp(x) =
Jq(x) =  1; that is, when both [x mod p] and [x mod q] are not quadratic residues
modulo p and q, and so x is not a quadratic residue modulo N .
Let introduce therefore the notation QNR+1N for this set of elements:
QNR+1N = {x 2 Z⇤N |JN(x) = +1, but x is not a quadratic residue modulo N}
Proposition 3.4 Let N = pq with p, q distinct, odd primes. Then:
Exactly half the elements of Z⇤N are in J +1N ;
QRN is contained in J +1N ;
Exactly half the elements of J +1N are in QRN (the other half are in QNR+1N ).
J +1N J  1N
QRN QNR+1N QNR 1N
Table 3.1: Distribution of the quadratic residues modulo N in Z⇤N .
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
We can now extend the Alg. 3.1 of the previous section to work modulo a
composite number N but only if the factorization of N is known.
Algorithm 3.2 Deciding quadratic residuosity modulo a composite
Input Composite N = pq; the factors p and q; x 2 Z⇤N
Output JN (x)
z1 := Jp(x) = [x p 12 mod p];
z2 := Jq(x) = [x q 12 mod q];
if z1 = z2 = +1 return ‘x is a quadratic residue
else return x is a quadratic non-residue
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When the factorization of N is unknown, however, there is no immediate way of
e ciently computing the Jacobi symbol modulo N , or e ciently deciding whether
a given element x is a quadratic residue modulo N or not. Somewhat surprisingly,
a highly non-trivial polynomial-time algorithm is known for computing JN(x) with-
out the factorization of N . This leads to a partial test of quadratic residuosity:
if, for a given input x it holds that JN(x) =  1, then x cannot possibly be a
quadratic residue. This test says nothing in case JN(x) =  1, and it is a reasonable
cryptographic assumption that no polynomial-time algorithm for deciding quadratic
residuosity in this case (that performs better than random guessing) exists.
We now formalize this assumption. Let GenModulus be a polynomial-time al-
gorithm that, on input 1n, outputs (N, p, q) where N = pq, and p and q are n-bit
primes except with probability negligible in n.
Definition 3.1We say “deciding quadratic residuosity is hard relative to GenModulus”
if for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms A there exists a negligible function
negl such that
|Pr[A(N, qr) = 1]  Pr[A(N, nqr) = 1]|  negl(n),
where in each case the probabilities are taken over the experiment in which GenModulus(1n)
is run to give (N ,p,q), qr is chosen at random from QRN and qnr is chosen at ran-
dom from QNR+1N .
The quadratic residuosity assumption is simply the assumption that there exists
a GenModulus relative to which deciding quadratic residuosity is hard. It is easy
to see that if deciding quadratic residuosity is hard relative to GenModulus, then
factoring is hard relative to GenModulus as well.
The Goldwasser-Micali (GM) Encryption Scheme is a public encryption scheme
for single bit-messages based on this Quadratic Residuosity assumption, i.e. the
hardness of distinguishing quadratic residues from (certain) quadratic non-residues
modulo a composite. The GM cryptosystem has homomorphic properties, in the
sense that if c0, c1 are the encryptions of bits m0, m1, then c0c1 mod N will be an
encryption of m0  m1
c0 · c1 = E(m0) · E(m1) = E(m0  m1)
where   denotes addition mod 2, (i.e. exclusive-or).
3.3.2 The Joye-Libert cryptosystem
At the EUROCRYPT 2013 conference, Marc Joye and Benoˆıt Libert presented a
paper with the title “E cient Cryptosystems From 2k-th Power Residue Symbols”,
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[18], to show a generalization of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, using 2k-th
power residues.
The new cryptosystem is e cient in both bandwidth and speed. Further they
inherit the useful features of the GM cryptosystem (like its homomorphic property)
and they are shown to be secure under a similar complexity assumption.
nth- power residues
First we recall some useful definitions from [18].
Joye and Libert extend the quadratic residue notion defining the n-th power
residue symbol.
Let N 2 N. For each integer n   2, they define (Z⇤N)n = {xn|x 2 Z⇤N} the set of
nth-power residues modulo N . If the relation a = xn has no solution in Z⇤N then a
is called a nth-power non-residue modulo N . Suppose that p is an odd prime. For
any integer a with gcd(a, p) = 1, it is easily verified that a is a nth-power residue
modulo p if and only if
a
p 1
gcd(n,p 1) ⌘ 1 (mod p)
There are several ways to generalize the Legendre symbol defined in Sec. 3.3.1.
Joye and Libert considered the n-th powein an his r residue symbol for a divisor n
of (p  1).
Definition 3.2 Let p be an odd prime and let n   2 such that n|p   1. Then the
symbol ✓
a
p
◆
n
= a
p 1
n mods p
is called the n-th power residue symbol modulo p.
Quadratic Residuosity
To emphasize that the Quadratic Residuosity assumption should hold for mod-
uli N = pq with p, q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k) Joye and Libert will refer to it as the k-QR
assumption. Formally:
Definition 3.3 (Quadratic Residuosity Assumption) Let RSAGen be a proba-
bilistic algorithm which, given a security parameter  , outputs primes p and q such
that p, q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k), and their product N = pq. The QuadraticResiduosity (k QR)
assumption asserts that the function Advk QRD (1
 ), defined as the distance   Pr[D(x,N) = 1|x R QRN ]  Pr[D(x,N) = 1|x R JN \QRN ]   
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is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities
are taken over the experiment of running (N, p, q)  RSAGen(1 ) and choosing at
random x 2 QRN and x 2 JN \QRN .
They also introduced a new assumption for RSA moduli N = pq when p, q ⌘ 1
(mod 4). Since  1 is a square modulo p and q, the square roots of any element
of QRN all have the same Jacobi symbol modulo N . The new assumption, which
they called the Squared Jacobi Symbol (SJS) assumption, posits the infeasibility of
determining whether
 
y
N
 
= 1 or  1 given (x,N) where x = y2 mod N . Formally:
Definition 3.4 (Squared Jacobi Symbol Assumption) Let RSAGen be a prob-
abilistic algorithm which, given a security parameter  , outputs primes p and q
such that p, q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k), and their product N = pq. The Squared Jacobi Symbol
(k SJS) assumption asserts that the function Advk SJSD (1 ), defined as the distance   Pr[D(y2 mod N,N) = 1|y  R JN ]  Pr[D(y2 mod N,N) = 1|y  R J¯N    
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D; the probabilities
are taken over the experiment of running (N, p, q)  RSAGen(1 ) and choosing at
random y 2 JN and y 2 J¯N .
The setting of the Joye-Libert cryptosystem is basically the same as for the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. The only additional requirement is that primes
p and q are chosen congruent to 1 modulo 2k where k denotes the bit-size of the
message being encrypted.
The scheme
In detail, the Joye-Libert (JL) Encryption Scheme is the tuple (KeyGen, Encrypt,
Eval, Decrypt) defined as follows.
KeyGen(1 )! (pk, evk, dk): it takes a security parameter   and randomly produce
primes p, q ⌘ 1(mod 2k ), setting N = pq and picking y 2 JN \ QRN . The
output is the tuple composed of the secret decryption key dk = {p}, the public
encryption key pk = {N, y, k} and the public evaluation key evk = {N, y, k}.
Encrypt(pk,m)! c: let consider an element m 2M to encrypt (seen as an integer
in {0, ..., 2k   1}) where M = {0, 1}k. The algorithm generates a random
x 2 Z⇤N and outputs the ciphertext c = ymx2k mod N .
Eval(evk, g, c1, ..., ct) ! c⇤: given the public evaluation key, a circuit g : Mt !M,
and a set of t ciphertexts c1, ..., ct, the algorithm deterministically compute
and output a ciphertext c⇤. Since that g is a circuit that can only manage
additions and multiplications by constants, every g function can be computed
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using the two elementary functions addition and multiplication by constant:
Add(c1, c2) ! c, where c1 and c2 are two ciphertexts and c = c1 ⇤ c2 mod
N , and CMult(c3, a) ! c0 where c3 is a ciphertext, a is a constant element in
M = {0, 1}k and c0 = ca3 mod N .
Decrypt(dk, c)! m: let c 2 Z⇤N a ciphertext and dk = {p} the private key; the
algorithm first computes z =
⇣
c
p
⌘
2k
and then finds m 2 {0, ..., 2k   1} such
that the relation ✓
y
p
◆
2k
 m
= z (mods p)
holds.
The case k = 1 of the JL cryptosystem corresponds to the Goldwasser-Micali
cryptosystem which has indistinguishable encryptions under the standard Quadratic
Residuosity assumption. For k   2 the scheme provides indistinguishable encryp-
tions under the k QR and k  SJS assumptions. We do not provide here the proof
and the discussion about security analysis; the reader can refer to [18] for more
details.
The GM cryptosystem is computationally e cient but somewhat wasteful in
bandwidth as k · log2N bits are needed to encrypt a k-bit message. The JL scheme
is instead more bandwidth-e cient; only log2N bits are needed for encrypting a
k-bit message in typical applications.
Similarly to the GM cryptosystem, the JL cryptosystem enjoys the additive
homomorphic encryption property, i.e. if c1 and c2 denote two ciphertexts corre-
sponding to k-bit plaintexts m1 an m2, respectively, then c1 · c2 (mod N) is an
encryption of the message m1 +m2 (mod 2k).
As last comment, we highlight that, for security reasons, is necessary that
1
4 log2N   k1 > k2, or equivalently, k1 < 14 log2N   k2 where k1 is the bit-size of
the message space and k2 is the security parameter.
In the rest of the thesis, we will refer to the above formula as the security check
of the Joye-Libert cryptosystem.
Decryption algorithms
One of the main advantages of the proposed cryptosystem is that it provides an
e cient (and practical) way to recover the message, even for large values of k. Fig.
3.1 shows the original decryption algorithm proposed by Joye and Libert.
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Algorithm 3.3 Decryption algorithm (1)
Input Ciphertext c, private key p (and public-key elements y and k)
Output Plaintext m = (mk 1, ...,m0)2
m 0;B  1
for i = 1 to k do
z  
⇣
c
p
⌘
2i
; t 
⇣
y
p
⌘m
2i
mods p
if (t /= z) then m m+B
B  2B
end for
return m
Figure 3.1: Original decryption algorithm of Joye and Libert.
The messagem 2 {0,1}k is viewed as a k-bit integer given by its binary expansion
m =
Pk 1
i=1 mi2
i, with mi 2 {0,1}. Given c = ymx2k mod N , we have
⇣ c
p
⌘
2i
=
⇣yPi 1j=0mj2j
p
⌘
2i
=
⇣y
p
⌘Pi 1
j=0mj2
j
2i
(mods p)
since ymx2
k
= y
Pi 1
j=0mj2
j · (y
Pk 1
j=1 mj2
j 1
x2
k 1
)2
i
, for 1  i  k. As a result, m can be
recovered bit by bit using p, starting from the rightmost bit. The algorithm uses an
accumulator B which contains the successive powers of 2.
Joye-Libert optimized decryption algorithms
Actually, the part of the JL cryptosystem concerning the decryption algorithms has
been subject of special interest. Indeed, in a full version of the paper appeared later
respect to the original version of the Joye-Libert paper, the authors added a section
containing some optimized decryption algorithms.
First modified decryption algorithm Let N = pq where p and q are prime, and
p, q ⌘ 1( mod 2k) but p, q /⌘ 1( mod 2k+1). In this case, we can write p = 2kp0 + 1
and q = 2kq0 + 1 for some odd integers p0 and q0. therefore as p = 2kp0 + 1 with p0
odd and since y 2 JN \QRN , it is easily seen that
y2
k 1p0 ⌘  1 (mod p)
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The proof of this statement is straightforward since we have y2
k 1p0 ⌘ y(p 1)/2 ⌘
y
p ⌘  1 (mod p). Consider now the ciphertext c = ymx2
k
mod N of messages
m =
k 1X
i=0
mi2
i with mi 2 {0,1}. If, for 1  j  k, we define
 j = 2
k jp0
and
Cj = c
 j mod p,
then, we have
Cj ⌘ (ymx2k) j ⌘ ym2k jp0 ⌘ y(m mod 2j)2k jp0 ⌘ y(mj 12j 1+
Pj 2
i=0 mi2
i)2k jp0
⌘ ymj 12k 1p0y(m mod 2j 1)2k jp0 ⌘ ( 1)mj 1y(m mod 2j 1) j (mod p)
Hence, it follows that
⇣ c
ym mod 2j 1
⌘ 
j
⌘ ( 1)mj 1 mod p
Starting from these formulas, they derived the first new algorithm with a private
key that now consists of the pair (p0, D) where D ⌘ y p0 mod p. Fig. 3.2 shows the
first modified decryption algorithm of Joye and Libert.
Algorithm 3.4 Decryption algorithm (2)
Input Ciphertext c, private key (p0, D) (and public-key elements y and k)
Output Plaintext m = (mk 1, ...,m0)2
m 0;B 1; D D
C = cp
0
mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do
z  C2k j mod p;
if (z /= 1) then m m+ B; C C · D mod p
B 2B; D D2 mod p
end for
if (C /= 1) then m m+ B
return m
Figure 3.2: First modified decryption algorithm of Joye and Libert.
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Second modified decryption algorithm The second proposed algorithm is just
a change of the previous, whereD is precomputed instead of being explicitly included
in the private key. Paying something more in terms of storage, we obtain better
performances. Now, the decryption key is defined by the tuple (p0,D[1],...,D[k  1])
where D[j] = D2
j 1
mod p for 1  j  k   1. Fig. 3.3 shows the second modified
algorithm of Joye and Libert.
Algorithm 3.5 Decryption algorithm (3)
Input Ciphertext c, private key (p0, D[1], ...D[k   1]) (and public-key elements y and k)
Output Plaintext m = (mk 1, ...,m0)2
m 0;B 1
for j = 1 to k   1 do D[j] D[j]
C = cp
0
mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do
z  C2k j mod p;
if (z /= 1) then m m+ B; C C · D[j] mod p
B 2B
end for
if (C /= 1) then m m+ B
return m
Figure 3.3: Second modified decryption algorithm of Joye and Libert.
Our new decryption algorithms
Actually, Joye and Libert proposed four optimized decryption algorithms. By
analysing such new algorithms during the study for this thesis and by trying to
implement them, we discovered that, among the four new algorithms two were in-
correct. After an exchange of e-mails, the authors confirmed my observation. From
that moment I started an investigation, in collaboration with Dario Fiore in an
attempt to discover new algorithms. This phase led to the definition of two new
algorithms, one of them performing even better of the correct improved algorithms
presented by JL.
In the previous part I have described only the two correct algorithms of JL, while
now we are going to start the description of our two new decryption algorithms ( Fig.
3.4 and Fig. 3.5 ). The decryption key is still defined by the tuple (p0,D[1],...,D[k 
1]) where D[j] = D2
j 1
mod p for 1  j  k   1.
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Algorithm 3.6 New decryption algorithm (5)
Input Ciphertext c, private key (p0, D[1], ...D[k   1]) (and public-key elements y and k)
Output Plaintext m = (mk 1, ...,m0)2
m 0;B 1
for j = 1 to k   1 do D[j] D[j]
C[0] = cp
0
mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do C[j] C[j   1]2 mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do
if (C[k   j] /= 1) then
m m+ B
for i = k   1 to j + 1 do C[k   i] C[k   i  1]2 mod p
end if
B 2B
end for
if (C[0] /= 1) then m m+ B
return m
Figure 3.4: Our first new decryption algorithm.
Algorithm 3.7 New decryption algorithm (4)
Input Ciphertext c, private key (p0, D[1], ...D[k   1]) (and public-key elements y and k)
Output Plaintext m = (mk 1, ...,m0)2
m 0;B 1
for j = 1 to k   1 do D[j] D[j]
C[0] = cp
0
mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do C[j] C[j   1]2 mod p
for j = 1 to k   1 do
if (C[k   j] /= 1) then
m m+ B
for i = j + 1 to k do C[k   i] C[k   i] · D[k   i+ j] mod p
end if
B 2B
end for
if (C[0] /= 1) then m m+ B
return m
Figure 3.5: Our second new decryption algorithm.38
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The Alg. 3.7 is the real new contribution. As we will see in the Chapter 6, it
provides significantly better performances than those provided by the algorithms of
Joye and Libert.
3.3.3 The Outsourcinglin scheme for computing linear func-
tions over the ring Z2k
We are almost ready to redefine the central scheme of this work. The basic idea of
the scheme is to combine the Joye-Libert linearly-homomorphic encryption scheme
with a linearly homomorphic MAC with e cient verification. The authors in [12]
designed a MAC that allows to authenticate linear computations over the group Z⇤N
which is the ciphertext space of the encryption scheme of Joye-Libert.
In particular, one of the more interesting tools to achieve e ciency is represented
by a new pseudorandom function (PRF) with amortized closed-form e ciency whose
security relied on the Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the subgroup
of 2k-residues of Z⇤N .
Amortized closed-form e cient pseudorandom function
1 A PRF consists of two algorithms (F.KG, F) such that the key generation F.KG
takes as input the security parameter 1  and outputs a secret key K and some public
parameters pp that specify domain X and range R of the function, and the function
FK(x) takes input x 2 X and uses the secret key K to compute a value R 2 R.
As usual, a PRF must satisfy the pseudorandomness property. Namely, we say that
(F.KG, F) is secure if for every PPT adversary A we have that:   Pr[AFK(·)(1 , pp) = 1]  Pr[A (·)(1 , pp) = 1]     ✏( )
where ✏( ) is negligible, (K, pp) F.KG(1 ), and   : X ! R is a random function.
In other words, it is not required for the element FK(·) to be indistinguishable
from the random function  (·); rather, the behaviour of any PPT adversary A
which is given oracle access to the function FK(·) must be indistinguishable from the
behaviour of the same adversary when given oracle access to the function  (·).
To put this yet in another way we can imagine to have two worlds: in the
first world the adversary queries the function FK(·) while in the second world the
adversary’s queries are answered by the truly random function  (·). Here by truly
1Much of this section has been copied verbatim from [12].
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random function we mean a black box which outputs a fresh random value on each
invocation, except that it is consistent, i.e. if queried twice on the same value, it
always returns the same output. Now we say that the security property is guaranteed
if, although the outputs given by FK(·) are clearly correlated while  (·)’s answers
are completely independent, the behaviour of the adversary is essentially the same,
so that it is not possible to tell these two worlds apart.2.
The following definition of pseudorandom functions with amortized closed-form
e ciency is taken from [3], which extend closed-form-e cient PRFs in [4].
Definition 3.5 (Amortized Closed-Form E ciency [3]) Consider a computa-
tion Comp that takes as input n random values R1, ..., Rn 2 R and a vector of m arbi-
trary values z = (z1, ..., zm), and assume that the computation of Comp(R1, ..., Rn, z1, ..., zm)
requires time t(n,m). Let L = (L1, ..., Ln) be arbitrary values in the domain X of
F such that each can be interpreted as Li = ( , ⌧i). We say that a PRF (F.KG, F)
satisfies amortized closed-form e ciency for (Comp, L) if there exist algorithms
CFEvalo↵Comp,⌧ and CFEval
on
Comp,  such that:
1. Given !  CFEvalo↵Comp,⌧ (K, z), we have that
CFEvalonComp, (K,!) = Comp(FK( , ⌧1), ..., FK( , ⌧n), z1, ..., zm);
2. the running time of CFEvalonComp, (K,!) is o(t).
A Realization Based on DDH over 2k-Residues in Z⇤N
Here it is described a closed-form e cient PRF based on the DDH assumption
in the subgroup of 2k-residues of Z⇤N .
Let f : Zt2k ! Z2k be a linear function f(Z1, ..., Zt) =
Pt
i=1 fi · Zi. We define
fˆ : (Z⇤N)t ! Z⇤N as the compilation of f on Z⇤N elements as:
fˆ(A1, ..., At) =
tY
i=1
Afii mod N
Below it is described the PRF with amortized closed-form e ciency for Comp(R1,
..., Rt, f) = fˆ(R1, ..., Rt):
F.KG(1 ). Let N = pq be the product of two k-quasi-safe primes3 p = 2kp0+1
and q = 2kq0 + 1. Let Rk be the following subgroup of Z⇤N , Rk = {x2k : x 2
2Extracted from [10]
3A safe prime is a prime number of the form 2p+1, where p is also a prime; we can equivalently
say that a safe prime q is such that (q  1)/2 is also a prime. More generally, a d-quasi-safe prime
q is such that (q   1)/2d is also a prime.
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Z⇤N}, and let g 2 Rk be a generator.
- Choose two seeds K1, K2 for a family of PRFs F0K1,2 : {0,1}⇤ ! Zp0q0 .
- Output K = (K1, K2) and pp = (N, k). These parameters define a function
F with domain X = {0, 1}⇤ ⇥ {0, 1}⇤ and range Z⇤N , as described below.
FK( , ⌧).
- Generate values v  F0K1(⌧) and b F0K2( ).
- Output R = gvb mod N .
CFEvalo↵⌧ (K, f). Parse K = (K1, K2) as a secret key for the PRF, and f as a
function (Z2k)t ! Z2k .
- For i = 1 to t, compute vi  F0K1(⌧i).
- Next, compute ⇢ gets f(v1, ..., vt) mod p0q0.
- Finally, output !f = ⇢.
CFEvalon  (K,!f ). Parse K = (K1, K2) as a secret key and !f = ⇢ as in the
previous algorithm. The online evaluation algorithm does the following:
- Generate b F0K2( ).
- Output W = g⇢b mod N .
The function above can be proven secure from the DDH assumption in Rk, that we
recall below.
Definition 3.6 (DDH) Let N = pq be the product of two k-quasi-safe primes
p = 2kp0 + 1 and q = 2kq0 + 1. Define Rk = {x2k : x 2 Z⇤N}, and let g 2 Rk be
a generator. Let a, b, c  Zp0q0 be chosen uniformly at random. We define the
advantage of an adversary A in solving the DDH problem as
AdvddhA ( ) = |Pr[A(N, k, g, ga, gb, gab) = 1]  Pr[A(N, k, g, ga, gb, gc) = 1]|
We say that the DDH assumption holds in Rk if for every PPT algorithm A we
have that AdvddhA ( ) is negligible.
Theorem 3.1. If the DDH assumption holds for Rk, and F0 is a family of pseudo-
random functions, then the function F described above is a pseudorandom function
with amortized closed-form e ciency for Comp = fˆ as defined above. 4
The Outsourcinglin scheme for linear functions
Now, we are really ready to present the scheme. Following the description of the
pseudorandom function introduced in the last section, it is possible to define two
4For the proof, refer to [12].
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di↵erent schemes, depending on the use of the amortized closed-form e ciency prop-
erty.
A full description of the scheme Outsourcinglin in absence of the ACF-e ciency
property follows:
KeyGen(1 )! (enck, compk, deck):
- Sample two large-enough k-quasi-safe primes p, q, such that p = 2kp0+1 and
q = 2kq0 + 1. Set N = pq, and sample y  R JN . Let us call Rk = {x2k : x 2
Z⇤N}
- Sample a random ↵  R Z⇤ (N), and run (K, pp)  R F.KG(1 ) to obtain the
seed and the public parameters of an ACF-e cient PRF FK : {0,1}⇤⇥{0,1}⇤ !
Rk.
- Output the encoding key enck = (k,N, y,↵, K), the computing key compk =
(N) and the decoding key deck = (k, p, p0, N, y,↵).
Encode(enck, L,m)!  m:
- The multi-label L = ( , ⌧) is the identifier of the input m 2 Z2k .
- Sample r  R Z⇤N and compute c = ymr2k mod N . Next compute R  
FK( , ⌧), and compute t = c↵ ·R mod N .
- Set  m = (c, t).
Compute(compk, f, )! ( y):
- Let f = (f1, ..., fn) 2 (Z2k)n be a linear function and let   = ( m1 =
(c1, t1), ...,  mn = (cn, tn)).
- First, compute C =
Qn
i=1 c
fi
i mod N to homomorphically evaluate f over the
ciphertexts (ci).
- Second, compute T =
Qn
i=1 t
fi
i mod N to homomorphically evaluate f over
the authentication tags (ti).
- Output  y = (C, T ).
Decode(deck,P ,  y)! (acc,m0):
- For i = 1 to n: Wi  FK( , ⌧i).
- Compute W =
Qn
i=1W
fi
i mod N .
- Next, if the following equation is satisfied set acc = 1 (accept). Otherwise,
set acc = 0 (reject).
T = C↵ ·W mod N
- If acc = 1, then compute (Cp )2k = C
p0 mod N = z, and find m0 2 {0,1}k
such that [(yp)2k ]
m0 = z (see refsubsec:3.3.2 for details). If acc = 0, set m0 = 0.
Finally, return (acc,m0).
A full description of the scheme Outsourcinglin in presence of the ACF-e ciency
property follows:
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KeyGen(1 )! (pk, sk):
- Sample two large-enough k-quasi-safe primes p, q, such that p = 2kp0+1 and
q = 2kq0 + 1. Set N = pq, and sample y  R JN . Let us call Rk = {x2k : x 2
Z⇤N}
- Sample a random ↵  R Z⇤ (N), and run (K, pp)  R F.KG(1 ) to obtain the
seed and the public parameters of an ACF-e cient PRF FK : {0,1}⇤⇥{0,1}⇤ !
Rk.
- Compute a concise verification information for f by using the o✏ine closed-
form e cient algorithm of F, i.e., !f  CFEValo↵⌧ (K, f).
- Output the encoding key enck = (k,N, y,↵, K), the computing key compk =
(N) and the decoding key deck = (k, p, p0, N, y,↵,!f ).
Encode(enck, L, m)!  m:
- The multi-label L = ( , ⌧) is the identifier of the input m 2 Z2k .
- Sample r  R Z⇤N and compute c = ymr2k mod N . Next compute R  
FK( , ⌧), and compute t = c↵ ·R mod N .
- Set  m = (c, t).
Compute(compk, f ,  )! ( y):
- Let f = (f1, ..., fn) 2 (Z2k)n be a linear function and let   = ( m1 =
(c1, t1), ...,  mn = (cn, tn)).
- First, compute C =
Qn
i=1 c
fi
i mod N to homomorphically evaluate f over the
ciphertexts (ci).
- Second, compute T =
Qn
i=1 t
fi
i mod N to homomorphically evaluate f over
the authentication tags (ti).
- Output  y = (C, T ).
Decode(deck, P ,  y = (C, T ))! (acc, y):
- Parse pp = (p,↵, K,!f ) as the secret key where !f is the concise verification
information for f .
- First, run the online closed-form e cient algorithm of F, to compute W  
CFEValon  (K,!f ).
- Next, if the following equation is satisfied set acc = 1 (accept). Otherwise,
set acc = 0 (reject).
T = C↵ ·W mod N
- If acc = 1, then compute (Cp )2k = C
p0 mod N = z, and find m0 2 {0,1}k such
that [(yp)2k ]
m0 = z (see Sec. 3.3.2.2 for details). If acc = 0, set m0 = 0. Finally,
return (acc,m0).
As we already said in Sec. 3.3.2.2, we have not provide the discussion about
security analysis of the JL cryptosystem; in such analysis, Joye-Libert define the
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Gap-2k-Residuosity assumption that we here propose in order to define the next
theorem.
Definition 3.7 (Gap-2k-Residuosity assumption) Let N = pq be the product of
two quasi-safe primes p = 2kp0 + 1 and q = 2kq0 + 1. Define Rk = {x2k : x 2 Z⇤N}.
Let x R Rk and y  JN \QRN . We say that the Gap-2k-Residuosity assumption
holds if for every PPT adversary A the following advantage is negligible:
AdvGap 2
k res(1 )=
   Pr[A(N, k, x) = 1]  Pr[A(N, k, y) = 1]   
Theorem 3.2 If F is a pseudorandom function and the Gap-2k-Residuosity assump-
tion holds, then Outsourcinglin is correct, secure and private.
The proof can be obtained modifying the proof present in [12].
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Chapter 4
A Framework for implementing
Outsourcing schemes
4.1 Framework architecture design
The goal of this chapter is to present the framework designed to implement the
model described in Sec. 3.1.
When one speaks about a framework, one means a complete support architecture,
or better a structure, used in computer science for a software development process,
with the goal to simplify the life of the programmer. More technically, a framework
can be a set of abstract classes together with the relations among them[?]. In this
sense, we can refer to this thesis work as to a framework, since basically it consists
of some “interfaces” that define a behaviour and that can be implemented every
time by a specific scheme.
As already explained in the Sec. 3.1, the Outsourcing scheme is born to cre-
ate a model that allows to be employed for doing verifiable computation together
with homomorphic encryption, but at the same time that could be usable for doing
only verifiable computation or only homomorphic encryption. The idea behind the
framework is essentially the same; we want to provide a common interface that could
be used to implement all those several outsourcing schemes.
This chapter is organized as follows: we first present the software tools employed
to build the framework (see Sec. 4.1.1 ), then we provide an high level description
of the structure of the framework (see Sec. 4.1.2 ).
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4.1.1 Support tools
The code of the software has been written in C++, using some external libraries:
NTL1 and Crypto++ Library 5.6.22.
NTL (A Library for doing Number Theory) is a high-performance, portable
C++ library providing data structures and algorithms for manipulating signed, ar-
bitrary length integers, and for vectors, matrices, and polynomials over the integers
and over finite fields. It provides high quality implementations of state-of- the-art
algorithms for:
arbitrary length integer arithmetic and arbitrary precision floating point arith-
metic;
polynomial arithmetic over the integers and finite fields (is one of the fastest
available anywhere, and has been used to set “world records” for polynomial
factorization and determining orders of elliptic curves);
lattice basis reduction (is also one of the best available anywhere, in terms of
both speed and robustness).
NTL can be used in conjunction with GMP (the GNU Multi-Precision library)
for enhanced performance. GMP is a free library for arbitrary precision arithmetic,
operating on signed integers, rational numbers, and floating-point numbers. There
is no practical limit to the precision except the ones implied by the available memory
in the machine GMP runs on. GMP has a rich set of functions, and the functions
have a regular interface. The main target applications for GMP are cryptography
applications and research, Internet security applications, algebra systems, compu-
tational algebra research, etc. GMP is carefully designed to be as fast as possible,
both for small operands and for huge operands. The speed is achieved by using full-
words as the basic arithmetic type, by using fast algorithms, with highly optimised
assembly code for the most common inner loops for a lot of CPUs, and by a general
emphasis on speed.
NTL provides a clean and consistent interface to a large variety of classes repre-
senting mathematical objects; indeed, the library consists of a number of software
modules (classes).
For the purpose of this work, just the module (class) ZZ it has been employed.
It is used to represent signed, arbitrary length integers. Routines are provided for
1http://www.shoup.net/ntl/
2http://www.cryptopp.com/
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all of the basic arithmetic operations, as well as for some more advanced operations
(such as Greatest Common Divisors (GCDs), Jacobi symbols, modular arithmetic,
and primality testing). The space is automatically managed by the constructors and
destructors. This module also provides routines for generating small primes, and
fast routines for performing modular arithmetic on single-precision numbers.
Crypto++ Library is a free C++ class library of cryptographic schemes. Cur-
rently the library contains algorithms for authenticated encryption schemes, high
speed stream ciphers, AES and AES candidates, block cipher modes of operation
(ECB, CBC, CBC Ciphertext Stealing, CFB, OFB, Counter Mode), hash functions
and many other things. The library has been basically used to build the pseudo-
random function of the cryptographic scheme implemented, and for this goal, AES
with few modes of operation (ECB and Counter Mode) and with SHA-3 (Keccak),
added in the last release, have been employed.
4.1.2 High level description
The step from the theoretical model towards the birth of the framework has been
quick and quite easy. Essentially, the core of the framework is represented by six
abstract base classes (C++ doesn’t provide the interface keyword as Java or C#
do), each one containing a pure virtual function reflecting one of the algorithms of
the Outsourcing scheme presented in Sec. 3.1.
The purpose of an abstract class (often referred to as an ABC) is to provide
an appropriate base class from which other classes can inherit. Abstract classes
cannot be used to instantiate objects and serves only as an interface. Attempting
to instantiate an object of an abstract class causes a compilation error. Thus, if a
subclass of an ABC needs to be instantiated, it has to implement each of the virtual
functions; in this way we say that it supports the interface declared by the ABC.
In order to define the virtual functions inside the six ABCs, some other support
classes have been defined. Some of them are basically empty classes, providing
just a default constructor and the destructor, and they should be extended every
time that a specific scheme has to be implemented (the child classes of such specific
implementation will inherit the required base classes of the framework specifying
the behaviour by adding the own members, data and functions); the other classes,
instead, contain also already defined data members and functions. Such classes are
born to be employed as they are and it is not possible to inherit them.
In the following part of this section I will present the structure of the framework,
describing each class with the support of pseudo UML class diagrams3 and, when
3In software engineering, a class diagram in the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a type of
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possible, showing part of the code.
In an e↵ort to facilitate the understanding of the composition of the framework,
we show the Table 4.1 containing all its classes. This table is composed of three
columns containing the six ABCs (interfaces), the classes that should be inherited
and the classes that do not have to be inherited, respectively.
Abstract classes Classes can be extended Classes do not extend
(interfaces)
SchemeKeyGen EncodKey Keys
SchemeEncode ComputKey OnlineDecodKey
SchemeCompute DecodKey Decoding
SchemeDecode OnDecodKey Program
SchemeOfflineDecode Label
SchemeOnlineDecode Message
Encoding
Program function
Comput inputs
My clock
Table 4.1: Framework content.
Why several ABCs?
To be thorough, I would like to motivate the choice of define many ABCs, each
with only one virtual function, instead of a single ABC containing all the virtual
functions. This choice is coherent with the model in Sec. 3.1; indeed, there are
many players acting di↵erent roles, e.g. a client that (can generate the keys) en-
codes the inputs and decodes the result, a remote server that computes the result
and sends it to the user.
For this reason, we want to guarantee the possibility to distribute the algorithms
of the model among the di↵erent acting nodes, e.g. instead of assign to the user the
role of generate the keys, there could be a specific process in charge of this task, as
well as the decoding algorithm could be executed by an user di↵erent from that who
asked the computation.
If there was only one ABC with all the virtual functions, every node should im-
plement all these virtual functions (maybe providing some blank implementations),
static structure diagram that describes the structure of a system by showing the system’s classes,
their attributes, operations (or methods), and the relationships among objects.
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even if it was interested in using just one of them. Using the configuration “one ab-
stract class —one virtual function” we increase the modularity, giving to every node
participating to the model the chance to choose which of the functions implement.
Key generation
The first ABC I am going to present is the SchemeKeyGen that contains the KeyGen
pure virtual function, Fig.4.1. It is the function corresponding to the KeyGen algo-
rithm of the Outsourcing scheme ( Sec. 3.1 ); it takes a long parameter, the security
parameter, and outputs an object of the Keys class.
1 class SchemeKeyGen{
2 public:
3 virtual Keys* KeyGen(long sec_param)=0;
4 };
Figure 4.1: The KeyGen pure virtual function inside the SchemeKeyGen abstract
class.
In the Outsourcing scheme the output of the KeyGen algorithm consists of the
three keys enck, compk and deck; in the framework they become the three classes
EncodKey, ComputKey and DecodKey), one for each of the algorithms (Encode,
Compute and Decode). When one will have to implement a specific scheme, one
will have to extend the three key classes, or just some of them, specifying the key
structure by adding specific data and function members.
The three keys are stored in an object of the not abstract class Keys that provides
also the set and get functions to manage them. So, the KeyGen virtual function
has the task of generating all the keys for the encoding, computing and decoding
phase, using them to build the Keys object that will be returned by the function.
Fig.4.2 shows a pseudo UML class diagram for the above classes.
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Figure 4.2: Pseudo UML class diagram for the SchemeKeyGen ABC, the Keys class
and the EncodKey, ComputKey and DecodKey classes.
Encoding
The next ABC is the SchemeEncode containing the pure virtual function Encode,
Fig.4.3; it takes as parameter the EncodKey (contained in the Keys object provided
by the keys generation function), a multi label, i.e. two objects of the Label class,
delta representing a data set and tau i associated with the message belonging to that
data set, and the message to encode (Message object). The output produced is an
encoding (Encoding object) to give to the remote server to compute with. Actually,
the SchemeEncode ABC provides also an overloaded Encode function that takes
as parameters only the EncodKey and the Message objects (that are the minimum
essentials elements of a generic encoding algorithm, i.e. think of a FHE).
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1 class SchemeEncode{
2 public:
3 virtual Encoding* Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const
Label& delta, const Label& tau_i, const Message& m)=0;
4 virtual Encoding* Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const
Message& m)=0;
5 };
Figure 4.3: The Encode pure virtual function inside the SchemeEncode abstract
class.
Note that such function Encode is slightly di↵erent from the theoretical Encode
algorithm of the Outsourcing scheme due to the fact that the multi-label L = ( , ⌧)
( Sec. 2.3.1.1 ) is represented in the framework with a couple of Label object, where
a Label object simply contains a string. The Label class can be used as it is or
it can be extended to be personalized. A Message object represents instead the
message to encode. The Message class is another class that will be surely extended
by each specific implementation in order to define the nature of the messages space.
The Encoding object symbolizes the  m output of the Encode algorithm of the
Outsourcing scheme. The Encoding class will have to be also extended in order to
fill it with the members that allow to define the encodings space. Fig.4.4 shows a
pseudo UML class diagram for the above classes.
Figure 4.4: Pseudo UML class diagram for the SchemeEncode ABC, the Encoding,
the Message and the Label classes.
As we have already said, the method Encode inside the SchemeEncode ABC is
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an overloaded method. There could be many schemes that do not provide for a
multi-label parameter (i.e. the Joye-Libert cryptosystem where the encoding phase
is basically an encryption that does not require any label). We can say that the
mandatory parameters are the EncodKey and the Message, while the two Label
objects (multi-label) are optional. This lead to an overloaded version of the method
that receive only two parameters, the EncodKey and the Message.
Computation
The pure virtual function that should be implemented by the server is the Compute
function, Fig.4.5, inside the SchemeCompute ABC. The function takes the ComputKey
(contained in the Keys object provided by the keys generation function) as first
parameter, a Program function object, and a Comput inputs object over which the
Program has to make the computation. Compute outputs an own encoding (object
Encoding) of the result.
1 class SchemeCompute{
2 public:
3 virtual Encoding* Compute(const ComputKey& compKey, const
Program_function& funct, const Comput_inputs& inputs)=0;
4 };
Figure 4.5: The Compute pure virtual function inside the SchemeCompute abstract
class.
Note that the Compute function takes the same parameters of the Compute al-
gorithm of the Outsourcing scheme; the Program function object represents the
function to be computed and every specific implementation will extend such class
specifying the own function. The Comput inputs represents the list of encodings to
give to the function as inputs; a Comput inputs object contains a vector of Encoding
objects together with the methods to fill such vector, to retrieve the elements, etc.
Fig.4.6 shows a pseudo UML class diagram for the above classes.
Decoding
The Encoding returned by the server is used in the decoding step by the Decode
pure virtual function, Fig.4.7, inside the SchemeDecode ABC; such function, using
the DecodKey (contained in the Keys object provided by the keys generation func-
tion), a Program object and a Label object, produces a Decoding object. Actually,
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Figure 4.6: Pseudo UML class diagram for the SchemeCompute ABC, the
Program function and the Comput inputs classes.
the SchemeDecode ABC provides also an overloaded Decode function that takes as
parameters only the DecodKey and the Encoding objects (that are the minimum
essentials elements of a generic decoding algorithm, i.e. think of a FHE).
1 class SchemeDecode{
2 public:
3 virtual Decoding* Decode(const DecodKey& decodKey, const
Program& prog, const Label& delta, const Encoding&
encod)=0;
4 virtual Decoding* Decode(const DecodKey& decodKey, const
Encoding& encod)=0;
5 };
Figure 4.7: The Decode pure virtual function inside the SchemeDecode abstract
class.
Remember that a labeled program P ( Sec. 2.3.1.1 ) is defined by a tuple
(f, ⌧1, ..., ⌧n) where f :Mn !M is a function on n variables, and each ⌧i 2 {0, 1}⇤ is
the label of the i-th variable input of f . In the framework, a labeled program P be-
comes an object of the Program class that contains the function (Program function
object) to be computed and the labels (Label objects) associated to the inputs of
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the function. In this way, the multi-labeled program P , present in the Decode al-
gorithm of the Outsourcing scheme, is represented with a couple of Program and
Label objects. Finally, an object of the Decoding class contains the acceptance
bit (boolean element) and a Message object. Fig.4.8 shows a pseudo UML class
diagram for the above classes.
Figure 4.8: Pseudo UML class diagram for the SchemeDecode ABC and the
Decoding class.
The same observation made for the Encode virtual function inside the SchemeEncode
ABC remains valid for the Decode virtual function inside the SchemeDecode ABC.
It is an overloaded method indeed there could be many schemes that do not provide
for a multi-labeled program, i.e. the couple composed by a Program and a Label
object (i.e. the Joye-Libert cryptosystem where the decoding phase is basically a
decryption that does not require any multi-labeled program). We can say that the
mandatory parameters are the DecodKey and the Encoding, while the Label and
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the Program are optional. This lead to an overloaded version of the method that
receive only two parameters, the DecodKey and the Encoding.
According to the theoretical model, in order to guarantee the e cient verification
property in the amortized sense, the decoding phase can be split into two steps; so,
the Decode function can be replaced with the OfflineDecode and OnlineDecode
pure virtual functions. The first, Fig.4.9, receives as parameters a DecodKey object
(contained in the Keys object provided by the keys generation function) and a
Program object and outputs an OnlineDecodKey object. Such OnlineDecodKey
object is then passed to the second method, Fig.4.10, together with a Label object
and the Encoding object generated by the server to finally produce the Decoding
object.
1 class SchemeOfflineDecode{
2 public:
3 virtual OnlineDecodKey* OfflineDecode(const DecodKey&
decodKey, const Program& prog)=0;
4 };
Figure 4.9: OfflineDecode pure virtual function inside the SchemeOfflineDecode
abstract class.
1 class SchemeOnlineDecode{
2 public:
3 virtual Decoding* OnlineDecode(const OnlineDecodKey&
onlineDecodKey, const Label& delta, const Encoding&
encod)=0;
4 };
Figure 4.10: OnlineDecode pure virtual function inside the SchemeOnlineDecode
abstract class.
An OnlineDecodKey object contains a DecodKey object and an OnDecodKey ob-
ject. The latter is an element dependent on the specific implementation, so one
needs to extend the OnDecodKey class. Fig.4.11 shows a pseudo UML class diagram
for the above classes.
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Figure 4.11: Pseudo UML class diagram for the SchemeOfflineDecode and the
SchemeOnlineDecode ABCs, the OnlineDecodKey and the OnDecodKey classes.
A clock utility
We conclude the description of the framework describing the last utility class. It
is about a clock class that can be used by each developer that wants to test the
timing performance of own code. Such class has been called My clock and every
object represents a clock; every clock object has two function start() and stop() to
respectively be called at the begin and at the end of the code one wants to evaluate.
Every computed time interval is stored by the clock object in a vector, and only
when the write log() function is called, the content of the vector is written into
a log file. Of course, every object clock has been provided with a security check
to avoid errors like stopping a clock not yet started or like starting a clock already
started. In all these cases, an exception is thrown.
Assuming that a clock is employed to evaluate many times the same code, maybe
for testing reasons, it is also possible asking to the clock to compute the average,
the variance and the standard deviation of all the values computed; to do this, one
needs to pass to the class constructor a ”true” set boolean value. A time interval is
retrieved by using the GetTme() function present in the NTL tools module. Such
function returns the number of seconds of CPU time used by the process. Probably
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there exist many other ways, more or less accurate, to get the temporal information
in C++, but the choice of using the GetTime() just seemed the simplest and the
best one, since that it belongs to the NTL library already used in the framework,
and because it provides a good accuracy guaranteeing cross-platform usability.
Final remarks
The My clock class description ends the presentation of the framework. Table 4.2
shows the mapping between the Outsourcing scheme algorithms and the pure virtual
functions contained in the six ABCs of the framework.
Outsourcing scheme algorithms
KeyGen( )! (pk, sk)
Encode(sk, L,m)!  m
Compute(pk, f, )! ( y)
Decode(sk,P , y)! (acc, y)
O✏ineDecode(sk,P)! OnDKP
OnlineDecode(sk,OnDKP , , s)! (acc, y)
Framework virtual functions
virtual Keys⇤ KeyGen(long RSA sec param)=0;
virtual Encoding⇤ Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const Label&
delta, const Label& tau i, const Message& m)=0;
virtual Encoding⇤ Compute(const ComputKey& compKey, const Program&
prog, const Comput inputs& inputs)=0;
virtual Decoding⇤ Decode(const DecodKey& decodKey, const Program&
prog, const Label& delta, const Encoding& encod)=0;
virtual OnlineDecodKey⇤ O✏ineDecode(const DecodKey& decodKey,
const Program& prog)=0;
virtual Decoding⇤ OnlineDecode(const OnlineDecodKey& onlineDecodKey,
const Label& delta, const Encoding& encod)=0;
Table 4.2: Equivalence between the Outsourcing scheme algorithms and the
Framework virtual functions.
57
Chapter 5
Implementations using our
Framework
This chapter of the thesis is dedicated to the description of some interesting imple-
mentations that use the framework presented in the previous chapter.
The primary goal of this work is to implement the Outsourcinglin scheme de-
scribed in Sec. 3.3.3.2. In order to do this, we first present the implementation of
the Joye-Libert cryptosystem (see Sec. 5.1 ), highlighting in this way how it is also
possible to employ the framework to implement even just a simple homomorphic
encryption scheme. In Sec. 5.2 we therefore implement the Outsourcinglin scheme.
5.1 Implementation of the Joye-Libert homomor-
phic encryption scheme
The first thing to do is understanding which interfaces of the framework we need
to implement and which classes we need to use or to extend. As we have al-
ready seen in Sec. 3.3.2.2, the scheme consists of the following algorithms: gen-
eration of the keys, encryption, decryption and evaluation. There is no an e -
cient verification property to satisfy (implementing the SchemeOfflineDecode and
SchemeOnlineDecode ABCs). So, only four ABCs of the framework must be imple-
mented:
SchemeKeyGen;
SchemeEncode;
SchemeCompute;
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SchemeDecode.
Regarding the classes, we do not need to use or to extend all those classes
related to the e cient verification algorithms (OnlineDecodKey, OnDecodKey, etc.).
So, the classes to extend are EncodKey, ComputKey, DecodKey, Message, Encoding
(and Program function) while the classes to simply use are Label and Decoding.
Actually the content of the ComputKey class is the same of EncodKey, because in
the case of the Joye-libert cryptosystem the evaluation key is represented by the
encoding key.
Note that, in the context of this cryptosystem, the names of the classes acquire
specific meanings: encode means encrypt while decode means decrypt ; in the same
way, an encoding object will represent an encryption object and a decoding object
will represent a decryption object.
5.1.1 Key generation
Recall from Sec. 3.3.2.2 that KeyGen(1 ) takes a security parameter  , randomly
generates primes p, q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k ) and sets N = pq and picks y 2 JN \QRN . The
public and secret keys are pk = {N, y, k} and sk = {p}, respectively.
The most interesting part of this algorithm is surely represented by the generation
of the two random primes p and q.
Before to analyze this part, I will show how the framework has been employed
to obtain the KeyGen algorithm.
What we need is to implement the KeyGen virtual function of the SchemeKeyGen
“interface” of the framework. For this reason, one can create a concrete class, i.e.
called JL 13 SchemeKeyGen, in which define a body for the KeyGen virtual function.
We could call the classes that inherit EncodKey and DecodKey, as JL 13 EncodeKey
and JL 13 DecodeKey, respectively.
The JL 13 EncodeKey class will contain:
- the NTL ZZ variables where store the public key elements (N , y, k, 2k);
- an additional constructor receiving as parameter the public key elements;
- a classic get function for each variable to retrieve.
Despite redundant,we chose to store also the value 2k in order to just increase the
e ciency and to avoid its re-computation every time that one needs it.
The JL 13 DecodeKey class will contain:
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- all the NTL ZZ variables for the secret (p) and public key elements (N , y, k) for
the decryption phase;
- an additional constructor receiving as parameter the secret and public key ele-
ments;
- a classic get function for each variable to retrieve.
Random primes generation
Here we recall some basic facts from [1] about prime numbers that are useful in
our work.
Definition 5.1 An integer n which is believed to be prime on the basis of a proba-
bilistic primality test is called a probable prime.
A primality test is a test to determine whether or not a given number is prime,
as opposed to actually decomposing the number into its constituent prime factors
(which is known as prime factorization). Primality tests come in two varieties: de-
terministic and probabilistic. Deterministic tests determine with absolute certainty
whether a number is prime. Probabilistic tests can potentially (although with very
small probability) falsely identify a composite number as prime (although not vice
versa). However, they are in general much faster than deterministic tests.
One commonly faced problem in cryptography is how to generate a prime number
of a given length in bits. The prime number theorem (PNT) describes the asymptotic
distribution of the prime numbers among the positive integers. It formalizes the
intuitive idea that primes become less common as they become larger. It asserts
that the proportion of (positive) integers  x that are prime is approximately 1/ ln x.
Since half of all integers  x are even, the proportion of odd integers  x that are
prime is approximately 2/ ln x.
From this fact we can determine a way to select a random k-bit (probable)
prime; it will be enough picking random k-bit odd integers n until one can be
declared “prime” by the miller-rabbin(n, t) algorithm for an appropriate value of
the security parameter t.
The Miller-Rabin test is the probabilistic primality test used most in practice,
also know as the strong pseudoprime test. It takes as inputs an odd integer n   3
and a security parameter t   1 (a parameter that determines the accuracy of the
test), and outputs an answer “prime” or “composite” to the question: “Is n prime?”.
In general, if a random k-bit odd integer n is divisible by a small prime, it is
less computationally expensive to rule out the candidate n by trivial division than
by using the Miller-Rabin test. Since the probability that a random integer n has
a small prime divisor is relatively large, before applying the Miller-Rabin test, the
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candidate n should be tested for small divisors below a pre-determined bound B.
This can be done by dividing n by all the primes below B, or by computing greatest
common divisor of n and (pre-computed) products of several of the primes  B.
The discussion about how finding the optimal trial division bound B lies outside of
this context (for more details refers to [1]).
Algorithm 5.1 Random search for a prime using the Miller-Rabin test
RANDOM-SEARCH(k,t)
INPUT: an integer k, and a security parameter t
OUTPUT a random k-bit probable prime
1. Generate an odd k-bit integer n at random.
2. Use trial division to determine whether n is divisible by any add odd prime  B. If it
is then go to step 1.
3. If the Miller-Rabin test with n and t outputs “prime” then return n. Otherwise, go to
step 1.
Since the Miller-Rabin test does not provide a mathematical proof that a num-
bers is indeed prime, the number n returned by Alg. 5.1 is a probable prime.
It is important, therefore, to have an estimation of the probability that n is in
fact composite. We denote this probability by pk,t. In [1] the authors provide some
mathematics formulas to establish some upper bounds on pk,t.
(i) pk,t < k242 
p
k for k   2;
(ii) pk,t < k3/22tt 1/242 
p
tk for (t = 2, k   88) or (3  t  k/9, k   21);
(iii) pk,t <
7
20k2
 5t + 17k
15/42 k/2 2t + 12k2 k/4 3t for k/9  t  k/4, k   21;
(iv) pk,t <
1
7k
15/42 k/2 2t for t   k/4, k   21.
Actually, there exist more accurate formulas that the authors don’t provide and
that have been used to produce the values in Table 5.1 that can be used to fix the
number of rounds t for the Miller-Rabin test.
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k t
100 27
150 18
200 15
250 12
300 9
350 8
400 7
450 6
k t
500 6
550 5
600 5
650 4
700 4
750 4
800 4
850 3
k t
900 3
950 3
1000 3
1050 3
1100 3
1150 3
1200 3
1250 3
k t
1300 2
1350 2
1400 2
1450 2
1500 2
1550 2
1600 2
1650 2
k t
1700 2
1750 2
1800 2
1850 2
1900 2
1950 2
2000 2
2050 2
Table 5.1: Smallest values of t for which pk,t  (12)80.
As we have already said, unfortunately the authors don’t provide the improved
formulas, so for the security parameters greater than 80 we have used the standard
formulas showed before in order to make the keys generation algorithm parametric
on the bit-size of the prime and on the security parameter.
Bit-size of the composite N
In order to determine the bit-size of the composite N we followed recommenda-
tions from a document of the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security in [2].
It is a report with cryptographic guidelines supporting the security measures
required to protect personal data in online systems. It discusses about conservative
guiding principles, based on current state-of-the-art research, addressing construc-
tion of new systems with a long life cycle. In the section 3.6 of such report the authors
provide a Key Size Analysis ( Fig. 5.1 ) essentially following the NIST equivalence
[19] between the di↵erent key sizes; we propose here a part of this section:
Providing key sizes for long term use is somewhat of a hit-and-miss a↵air,
for a start it assumes that the algorithm you are selecting a key size for
is not broken in the mean time. So in providing key sizes for specific
application domains we make an implicit assumption that the primitive,
scheme or protocol which utilises this key size is not broken in the near
future. All primitives and schemes marked as suitable for future use in
this document we have confidence will remain secure for a significant
period of time. Making this assumption still implies a degree of choice
as to key size however. The AES block cipher may remain secure for
the next fifty years, but one is likely to want to use a larger key size for
data which one wishes to secure for fifty years as opposed to, say, five
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years. Thus in providing key size guidelines we make two distinct cases
for schemes relevant for future use. The first cases is for security which
you want to ensure for at least ten years (which we call near term),
and secondly for security for thirty to fifty years (which we call long
term). Again we reiterate these are purely key size guidelines and they
do not guarantee security, nor do they guarantee against attacks on the
underlying mathematical primitives.
Figure 5.1: Key Size Analysis. A ⇤ notes the value could be smaller due to specific
protocol or system reasons, the value given is for general purposes.
The recommendations for the RSA problem actually follow state of the art re-
search in factoring algorithms. Since the assumptions used for our schemes (e.g. the
Joye-Libert cryptosystem and the Outsourcinglin scheme) are related to factoring
we follow these recommendations. For this reason, in the code we will show in the
following, we will refer to the security parameter with the name RSA sec param.
A discussion about the number of rounds t for the Miller-Rabin test
As we have said before, in order to determine the number t for the Miller Rabin
test, we should use the formulas presented above. In this section, we show that we
can actually focus just on one formula and use it to individuate the best value t.
Considering our implementation, we have just seen that the composite number N
can assume three di↵erent values depending on the security parameter; once that
we determine N , we know that the bit-size of the two primes p and q (equal to bit
size of N divided by 2), respectively.
Let’s consider the formula (ii) ; we can use such formula if t  k/9 where k is
the bit size of the number of which we want to check the primality. In our case we
know k that is the bit size of p (and q), and we can a rm that the desired value of
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t (for each security parameter) is always in this interval, so we can use the formula
(ii) . Table 5.2 shows the computed values of t for each bit size of Nk (namely of
p and q).
bit size of N t
1024 5
3072 4
15360 3
Table 5.2: Number or rounds t for the Miller Rabin test depending on the bit size
of N .
Code
All the previous considerations have been used to randomly generates the two
primes p, q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k ). Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 show the code of the random
primes generation inside the KeyGen function.
As it is possible to see from the code, there is a preliminary setting phase to
determine the right bit size of the numbers p0 and q0 so that the bit size of p and q
is compliant with the bit size of N . Then, in order, there is the procedure before
described to fix the number of tests to pass to the function ProbPrime and the
security check ( Sec. 3.3.2.2 ). long ProbPrime(const ZZ& n, long NumTrials
= 10) is a function of the NTL ZZ class and it performs up to NumTrials Miller-
Rabin tests (after some trial division) to say if n is a probable prime; it essentially
implements the Alg. 5.1. void RandomLen(ZZ& x, long num bits) is another
function of the NTL ZZ class and it generates a pseudo-random number x with
precisely num bits bits, or 0 if num bits  0.
The last part of the KeyGen function picks a y 2 JN \ QRN . This result is
obtained by implementing the Alg. 3.2. The code of such implementation is shown
in Fig. 5.4.
void RandomBnd(ZZ& x, const ZZ& n) is a NTL ZZ class function that out-
puts a pseudo-random number in the range 0..n   1, or 0 if n  0. ZZ GCD(const
ZZ& a, const ZZ& b) is also a NTL ZZ class function that computes the Great-
est Common Divisor (GCD) between a and b; it uses a binary GCD algorithm.
long Jacobi(const ZZ& a, const ZZ& n) is another NTL ZZ class function that
computes the Jacobi symbol of a and n, assuming 0  a < n, and n odd.
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1 Keys* JL_13_SchemeKeyGen:: KeyGen(long sec_param )
2 {
3 //...
4 long N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size=0;
5 switch(RSA_sec_param){
6 case(80):
7 N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size= 1024;
8 miller_rabin_tests=5;
9 break;
10 case(128):
11 N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size= 3072;
12 miller_rabin_tests=4;
13 break;
14 case(256):
15 N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size= 15360;
16 miller_rabin_tests=3;
17 break;
18 default:
19 N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size= 1024;
20 miller_rabin_tests=5;
21 break;
22 }
23 try{
24 if(k_message_bit_size>=N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size/4-RSA_sec_param)
25 throw sec_exec;
26 }
27 catch (exception& e){
28 cout << e.what() << ’\n’;
29 return NULL;
30 }
31 ZZ seed(GetTime()*rand());
32 SetSeed(seed);
33 long bit_size_p_q_prime=(N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size/2) -
k_message_bit_size;
34 //...
Figure 5.2: Part (a) of the KeyGen virtual function inside the JL 13 SchemeKeyGen
class.
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36
37 ZZ two_to_the_k;
38 power2(two_to_the_k, k_message_bit_size);
39 ZZ p,p_prime;
40 RandomLen(p_prime,bit_size_p_q_prime);
41 while(!ProbPrime(two_to_the_k*p_prime+1,miller_rabin_tests)){
42 RandomLen(p_prime,bit_size_p_q_prime);
43 };
44 p=two_to_the_k*p_prime+1;
45 ZZ q,q_prime;
46 RandomLen(q_prime,bit_size_p_q_prime);
47 while(!ProbPrime(two_to_the_k*q_prime+1,miller_rabin_tests)){
48 RandomLen(q_prime,bit_size_p_q_prime);
49 };
50 q=two_to_the_k*q_prime+1;
51 //...
Figure 5.3: Part (b) of the KeyGen function inside the JL 13 SchemeKeyGen class.
5.1.2 Encoding
In this case, what we need is the Encode virtual function of the SchemeEncode “in-
terface” of the framework. As always, one can create a concrete class, i.e. called
JL 13 SchemeEncode, in which define a body for the Encode virtual function, specif-
ically the overloaded Encode function that takes as parameters only the EncodKey
and the Message objects. There are no special observations to make about the
encoding (encryption) step. The code simply reflects the algorithm showed in the
scheme description in Sec. 3.3.2.2. The code is shown in Fig. 5.5.
We could call the class that inherits the Message class as JL 13 Message class.
It will contain:
- a NTL ZZ object where to store the value to encrypt;
- an additional constructor receiving as parameter directly a NTL ZZ object repre-
senting the value to encrypt;
- an additional constructor receiving as parameter a long representing the bit size
of the integer to encrypt; in this case, inside the constructor it will be called an
other function of the class to generate a random NTL ZZ integer of the right size
representing the value to encrypt;
- a classic get function to retrieve the NTL ZZ object value.
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61 //...
62 ZZ y, gcd, b1, b2;
63 do{
64 b1=0; b2=0;
65 do{
66 RandomBnd(y,N); //y=pseudo-random number in the range
0..N-1, or 0 if N <= 0
67 gcd=GCD(y,N);
68 }
69 while(gcd!=1);
70 b1 = Jacobi(y%p,p);
71 b2 = Jacobi(y%q,q);
72 }
73 while(b1!=-1 or b2!=-1);
74 //...
75 JL_13_EncodKey* encrypKey= new
JL_13_EncodKey(N,y,k_message_bit_size);
76 JL_13_DecodKey* decrypKey= new
JL_13_DecodKey(p,y,k_message_bit_size,p_prime);
77 ComputKey* computKey=NULL;
78 Keys* keys= new Keys(encrypKey,computKey,decrypKey);
79 return keys;
80 }
Figure 5.4: Part (c) of the KeyGen function inside the JL 13 SchemeKeyGen class.
The class JL 13 Encoding is the class that inherits the Encoding class of the frame-
work. It will contain:
- a NTL ZZ object where store the value to decrypt;
- an additional constructor receiving as parameter directly a NTL ZZ object repre-
senting the value to decrypt (ciphertext);
- a classic get function to return the NTL ZZ object value;
void PowerMod(ZZ& x, const ZZ& a, const ZZ& e, const ZZ& n) and void
MulMod(ZZ& x, const ZZ& a, const ZZ& b, const ZZ& n) are two NTL ZZ class
routines among those performing arithmetic mod n, where n > 1. The first com-
putes x = ae mod n while the latter computes x = (a ⇤ b) mod n. All arguments
(other than exponents) are assumed to be in the range 0..n   1. The PowerMod
function checks this and raises an error if this does not hold.
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1 Encoding* JL_13_SchemeEncode:: Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const
Message& mess)
2 {
3 //...
4 JL_13_Encoding* encoding=NULL;
5 ZZ m=(dynamic_cast<const JL_13_Message&>(mess)).to_ZZ();
6 ZZ x,gcd;
7 do{
8 RandomBnd(x,N);
9 gcd=GCD(x,N);
10 }
11 while(gcd!=1);
12 ZZ y_to_the_m;
13 PowerMod(y_to_the_m,y,m,N);
14 ZZ x_to_the_two_to_the_k;
15 PowerMod(x_to_the_two_to_the_k,x,two_to_the_k,N);
16 ZZ c;
17 c=MulMod(y_to_the_m, x_to_the_two_to_the_k, N);
18 //...
19 encoding= new JL_13_Encoding(c);
20 return encoding;
21 }
Figure 5.5: Part of the Encode function inside the JL 13 SchemeEncode class.
Our implementation requires that the application generates a certain number
of encodings (of random messages) that will be inserted in an object of the class
Comput inputs; such object will be than passed to the Compute function we will
examine in the following. Fig. 5.6 shows the code inside a possible main application.
5.1.3 Computation
In this case, what we need is the Compute virtual function of the SchemeCompute
“interface” of the framework. As always, one can create a concrete class, i.e. called
JL 13 SchemeCompute, in which define a body for the Compute virtual function.
There are no special observations to make about the computation (evaluation) step.
Fig. 5.7 shows the code.
In this our implementation of JL, we have chosen to implement the composition
of the two basic functions Add and CMult presented in the Eval algorithm. Namely,
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1 int i;
2 int num_mess;
3 vector<JL_13_Message> messages;
4 for(num_mess=1;num_mess<=2;num_mess++){
5 JL_13_Message my_message(k_message_bit_size);
6 messages.push_back(my_message);
7 }
8 const JL_13_EncodKey* encodkey=dynamic_cast<const
JL_13_EncodKey*>(keys->get_encodKey());
9 if (encodkey==0) {
10 cout << "Null pointer on main: dynamic_cast of
EncodKey*\n";
11 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
12 }
13 Comput_inputs comput_inputs;
14 Encoding* cipher;
15 for(num_mess=0;num_mess<(int)messages.size();num_mess++){
16 cipher=encrypt.Encode(*encodkey,
messages[num_mess]);
17 comput_inputs.append_Encoding(cipher);
18 }
19 ...
Figure 5.6: A portion of a possible main application.
a set given a= (a1, ..., an) of n random elements belonging to the message space,
and considering n ciphertexts, c=(c1, ..., cn) the function f we chose outputs c
a1
1 ·
ca22 , ..., cnan.
We have to extend the Program function class to contain the n coe cients
ai. The extended class will contain a vector of NTL ZZ elements representing the
coe cients of the function and all the support methods to get information about
the vector (i.e. size, elements indexes, etc.).
5.1.4 Decoding
In this case, what we need is the Decode virtual function of the SchemeDecode
“interface” of the framework. As always, one can create a concrete class, i.e. called
JL 13 SchemeDecode, in which define a body for the Decode virtual function, in
particular the overloaded function Decode that does not take as parameters the
Program and the Label objects. There are no special observations to make about
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1 Encoding* JL_13_SchemeCompute:: Compute(const ComputKey& compKey,
const Program_function& funct,const Comput_inputs& vec)
2 {
3 JL_13_Encoding* encoding=NULL;
4 ZZ N=(dynamic_cast<const JL_13_ComputKey&>(compKey)).get_N();
5 JL_13_Program_function function(dynamic_cast<const
JL_13_Program_function&>(funct));
6 ZZ c(1);
7 int n;
8 ZZ c_i,fi,N;
9 int ciphers=vec.get_vector_size();
10 JL_13_Encoding* enc;
11 for(n=0;n<ciphers;n++){
12 fi=function.get_coefficient(n);
13 enc=(dynamic_cast<JL_13_Encoding*>(vec.get_Encoding(n)));
14 c_i=enc->get_Ciphertext();
15 PowerMod(power, c_i, fi, N);
16 MulMod(c,c,power,N);
17 }
18 encoding = new JL_13_Encoding(c);
19 return encoding;
20 }
Figure 5.7: The Compute function inside the JL 13 SchemeCompute class.
the decoding (decryption) step. The code simply reflects the algorithm Alg. 3.7
showed in Sec. 3.3.2.4 where we have introduced our new decryption algorithms.
Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9 show such code.
5.2 Implementation of the Outsourcinglin scheme
In this section I am going to present the implementation of the Outsourcinglin scheme
described in Sec. 3.3.3.2. Such implementation will allow to show a complete use of
the framework where all the classes are employed.
Recall that the Outsourcinglin scheme consists of all the possible phases: gener-
ation of the keys, encoding, computation and decoding. So, all the ABCs of the
framework must be implemented.
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1 Decoding* JL_13_SchemeDecode:: Decode(const DecodKey& decodKey, const
Encoding& encod)
2 {
3 Decoding* decoding=NULL;
4 JL_13_DecodKey JL_decodKey(dynamic_cast<const
JL_13_DecodKey&>(decodKey));
5 JL_13_Encoding JL_encoding(dynamic_cast<const
JL_13_Encoding&>(encod));
6 ZZ p = JL_decodKey.get_p();
7 long k_message_bit_size = JL_decodKey.get_k_message_bit_size();
8 ZZ y = JL_decodKey.get_y();
9 ZZ p_prime=JL_decodKey.get_p_prime();
10 ZZ c = JL_encoding.get_Ciphertext();
11 ZZ m(0);
12 ZZ A(1);
13 ZZ B(1);
14 ZZ D;
15 PowerMod(D,operator%(y,p),operator-(p_prime),p);
16 int i,j;
17 std::vector<ZZ> Ds;
18 Ds.push_back(m); //just tu put 0 in the element of index 0
19 for(j=1;j<=k_message_bit_size-1;j++)
20 {
21 Ds.push_back(PowerMod(D,power2_ZZ(j-1),p));
22 }
23 //...
Figure 5.8: Part (a) of the Decode function inside the JL 13 SchemeDecode class.
5.2.1 Implementation of the amortized closed-form e cient
pseudorandom function
The most interesting part of the implementation of the Outsourcinglin is surely repre-
sented by the amortized closed-form e cient pseudorandom function (ACF-e cient
PRF) described in Sec. 3.3.3.1.
The goal of the following section is to describe the realization of the generic PRF
(without caring about the ACF-e ciency property) showing before the theoretical
construction and then the practical implementation. As already touched on in the
Chap.4, the PRF has been implemented using the Crypto++ library.
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31 vector<ZZ> C;
32 C.push_back(PowerMod(operator%(c,p),p_prime,p));
33 for(j=1;j<=k_message_bit_size-1;j++)
34 {
35 C.push_back(PowerMod(C[j-1],2,p));
36 }
37 for(j=1;j<=k_message_bit_size-1;j++)
38 {
39 if((operator==(1,C[k_message_bit_size-j]))==0) //are
different
40 {
41 operator+=(m,B);
42 for(i=j+1;i<=k_message_bit_size;i++)
43 {
44 C[k_message_bit_size-i]=MulMod(C[k_message_bit_size-i],
Ds[k_message_bit_size-i+j],p);
45 }
46 }
47 operator*=(B,2);
48 }
49 if((operator==(1,C[0]))==0) //if 1!=C[0]
50 operator+=(m,B);
51 JL_13_Message* mess= new JL_13_Message(m);
52 decoding= new Decoding(true,mess);
53 return decoding;
54 }
Figure 5.9: Part (b) of the Decode function inside the JL 13 SchemeDecode class.
The pseudorandom function theoretical construction
Pseudo random functions are a very powerful cryptographic tool. Practical PRFs
typically have fixed input and output size, often roughly equal to the security pa-
rameter   (say, both being 128 bits).
The first consideration about the PRF described in Sec. 3.3.3.1 is that we need a
standard PRF mapping arbitrary-long strings into integers in Zp0q0 ; i.e. F : {0,1}⇤ !
Zp0q0 .
To achieve the best e ciency, our goal is to realize the PRF using the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher.
Let’s assume therefore to have this ideal object AES ( Fig. 5.10) that, given a
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security parameter  , uses a key of   bits, takes an input of 128 bits and produces
an output of 128 bits.
Figure 5.10: AES ideal object.
Due to the fact that our PRF, starting from a string of bit of arbitrary length
({0,1}⇤), outputs an integer in ZN , specifically in Zp0q0 , we need to solve the following
two problems:
1. how to pass to our ideal AES block an arbitrary length input;
2. how to obtain as output an integer in ZN .
How to obtain an arbitrary length input
Formally, in order to solve the first issue (1), we will first realize a function
f  : {0,1}⇤ ! {0,1}128 ( Fig. 5.11).
Figure 5.11: Function f .
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Dealing with inputs of arbitrary length can be easily achieved by employing a
cryptographic hash function. Very informally, a hash function is any function that
can be used to map digital data of arbitrary size to digital data of fixed size. The
input data is often called the message, and the hash value is often called the message
digest or simply the digest.
In our construction, the bit-size of the message digest is set equal to the double
of the AES key bit-size, i.e. 2 . This choice is related to an important property
that a hash function has to have, namely the collision resistance property. Such
property a rms that it should be di cult to find two di↵erent messages m1 and
m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2). Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash
collision. This property is sometimes referred to as strong collision resistance. If
we want to guarantee the security level given by   we have to fix the digest bit-size
equal to 2 ; otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack 1.
Formally what we are obtaining in this way is a function h : {0,1}⇤ ! {0,1}2 
( Fig. 5.12); and this is di↵erent from what we wanted. Indeed we have solved the
problem of the arbitrary length input but, on the other hand, the output of this new
function h is 2  > 128, since     80 in our setting.
Figure 5.12: Function h.
This leads to the new question of how obtaining an output of 128 bits. This
obstacle has been overcome by applying the AES block cipher in the cascade mode.
2 Using cascade mode
1A birthday attack is a type of cryptographic attack that exploits the mathematics behind the
birthday problem in probability theory. Refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_
attack for more details.
2This paragraph has been copied verbatim from [11].
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By exploiting the cascade mode, we want to realize, in a secure way, a new PRF
that starting from a string of 2  bit, outputs a string of 128 bit, using our elementary
PRF ( Fig. 5.10 ).
We want to build a PRF function f 0 : {0,1}L ! {0,1}l using a di↵erent PRF
family {fj}. Specifically, we do not care as much about the input size of fj (but the
large the better), let use call it b, but care that the output size is l and the key size
k is at most l. Consider now a message m and split it into m1, ...,mn, except now
each chuck is of size b, so that L = b · n. The initial key j to f 0 is chosen at random
from {0,1}l, and then we inductively define values x0, ..., xn 2 {0,1}l as follows:
x0 = j
xi = fxi 1(mi)
Finally the output f 0(m1, ...,mn) = xn ( Fig. 5.13 ). To describe it di↵erently,
fj(m1) determines the PRF key x1 to be used in the next round with input m2,
which in turn defines the PRF key x2 to be used with the next input block m3,
and so on. This construction is called cascade or Merkle-Damgard. Notice, it really
works for any input size b   1, at the price of using L/b evaluations of the underlying
PRF fj (so larger b yields more e ciency).
Figure 5.13: Cascade Mode.
The intuition behind this construction is quite simple. First, since all xi’s are
PRF outputs, they are computationally indistinguishable from random. Second,
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the very first block i separating two L-bit messages m and u would result in two
computationally independent PRF keys xi derived after the i-th call to f , and from
this point on evaluating f 0 on m and u looks totally independent.
Theorem 5.1 The cascade construction defines a PRF from L bits to l bits. 3
In our specific case the PRF ft is represented by the AES block cipher, so the
output size l is equal to 128 bit (the AES block cipher bit-size), the input size b is
again 128, the L value is the message digest bit-size and the l value is again 128;
the initial key t is the first element k1 (k2) of the seed K1 (K2), and it is still 128
bits. Formally, our function will be f 0 : {0,1}2  ! {0,1}128 ( Fig. 5.14 ).
Figure 5.14: AES Cascade Mode in our construction.
So if the AES key bit-size is 128, e.g. in the case of the security parameter equal
to 128 bit, we have that the hash function outputs a digest of 256 bit (there not
exists a hash function with digest 160 ), so it will be split into two block of 128 bits;
the first one will become the input of a first AES block cipher (with key k1) that
will output some intermediate 128 bits; such intermediate 128 bits will be the new
key for a second AES block cipher that will take as input the second block of 128
bits of the message digest.
3We do not give the proof, based on a lemma that it is her not provided. The reader can refer
to [11].
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We have finally reach the goal. The initial function f  : {0,1} ⇤   ! {0,1}128
can be realized as the composition of the two function h : {0,1}⇤ ! {0,1}2  and
f 0 : {0,1}2  ! {0,1}128 ( Fig. 5.15 ).
Figure 5.15: Construction of function f .
How to obtain as output an integer in ZN
Let consider the general case of N , knowing that in the specific case of our
PRF, N = p0q0. The final step is to obtain the output integer in ZN . Considering
that in our application N is always larger than 2128, we need to expand the 128
bits string obtained with f to an l bits string, for some l > logN ; such string
will then be converted to an integer, and finally we apply the arithmetic module
operator. Formally, in order to solve such issue, we would like to define a function
g : {0,1}128 ! {0,1}l ( Fig. 5.16 ).
The bit-size of the product N will be always much greater than 128 bit. So we
have to determine how the bit-size l has to be greater than N to securely apply
the modular reduction operator. Formally, if f(x) is the output of the function
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Figure 5.16: Function f  + function g.
previously built, applied on an arbitrary length input string x, and g is the function
we are looking for, we would build our final function F : {0,1}⇤ ! ZN as F (x) =
g(f(x)) mod N .
How to determine the l output bit-size
As a first step we first study what is a good value of l that maintains security.
Let us first recall the notion of Statistical Distance.
Definition 5.2 (Statistical Distance). Let X, Y be two random variables over a
finite set U . The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as
SD[X, Y ] =
1
2
X
u2U
   Pr[X = u]  Pr[Y = u]   
The explanation of why we chose this measure follows. Very informally, con-
sidering ZN , assuming that R = {0,1}l is the range of the PRF and that y  R
{0, ...,2l  1} is randomly chosen, we have to guarantee that the element z = y mod
N is chosen with the same distribution with which we pick an element z  R ZN .
Formally,
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Lemma 5.1 Let consider N and l, with l, N 2 N. Let be N = 2lN and l   lN .
Consider the following two experiments: Experiment ExpA(N)
z  R ZN
Experiment ExpB(N, l)
y  R {0, ...,2l   1}; z = y mod N .
Then
SD[A,B] =
1
2
N 1X
x=0
  Pr[z = x|z  ExpA(N)]  Pr[z = x|z  ExpB(N, l)]   = 2lN
2 · 2l
Proof
Let define C = 2l.
SD[A,B] =
1
2
N 1X
x=0
   1
N
 
✓
1
C
+
C/N
C
◆    = 1
2
N 1X
x=0
   1
N
  1
C
  1
N
   = N
2C
=
2lN
2 · 2l
Corollary 5.1 Let consider a security parameter   and let ExpA( , N) and ExpB( , N, l)
two experiments as defined in Lemma 5.1. Let be l   lN + 1    . Then, from
the Lemma 5.1 follows that SD[A,B] =
1
2
N 1X
x=0
  Pr[z = x|z  ExpA( , N)] Pr[z = x|z  ExpB( , N, l)]    1
2 
= negl( )
Therefore, using the above result, the bit-size of the PRF output can be easily
determined by adding the security parameter   to the bit-size of the number N , i.e.
set l = lN +  .
Now that we know the output bit-size length l, we have to construct the function
g. To this end we use the block cipher AES in Counter mode (CNT).
CTR uses a running counter block. Each block of plain text is encrypted inde-
pendently, rather than with the results of a previous set of rounds. The counter
includes a nonce and an initial counter block. The Key and Counter are encrypted,
and then the result is XOR’d with the plain text ( Fig. 5.17). The mode does not
require padding the plain text to the block size of the cipher.
The counter has the size of the cipher’s block size. In the case of default AES,
this would be 16 bytes. NIST Special Publication 800-38A [?] specifies two methods
for using the CTR mode. The first is a counter which is made up of a nonce and
counter. The nonce is random, and the remaining bytes are counter bytes (which
are incremented). For example, a 16 byte block cipher might use the high 8 bytes as
a nonce, and the low 8 bytes as a counter; the second method uses the entire block
cipher size (16 bytes in the case of AES) as a monotonically increasing value. If we
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inspect the Crypto++ library source code (modes.h), we can see that the library
uses this method, which means the entire byte block is treated as counter bytes.
Figure 5.17: CTR Mode.
Basically, through the use of the CTR mode we would to obtain a Pseudorandom
Number Generator (PRG). A PRG is a deterministic polynomial-time computable
function G : {0, 1}k ! {0, 1}p(k) (defined for all k > 0) that stretches a short random
seed x 2 {0, 1}k into a longer output G(x) of length p(k) > k which nevertheless
looks like a random p(k)-bit strings to any computationally bounded adversary (the
distinguisher).
In our construction, the counter will be the output of the function f , the key will
be the second element k01 (k
0
2) of the seed K1 (K2); the plaintext will be an empty
message (all 0s bit) of bit-size equal to the PRF output bit-size. At the end, the l
bits produced by the CTR mode will be the final output; they will be converted in
an integer.
As a last comment we have to say that in the Crypto++ library there not exists
the ideal object AES described in Fig.5.10. In Crypto++ When we use symmetric
ciphers, we have to choose a cipher and a mode of operation. The cipher chosen
has been the AES while the mode has been the Electronic Cookbook (ECB). ECB
is the simplest of the methods. A message is broken into blocks, and each block is
combined with the key ( Fig. 5.18).
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Figure 5.18: ECB Mode.
Fig. 5.19 shows the complete construction scheme of the PRF.
Figure 5.19: Complete construction scheme of the PRF.
Implementation of the amortized closed-form e cient pseudorandom func-
tion
The part of the implementation about the PRF consists of 4 classes:
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- PRF;
- PRF parameters;
- PRF seeds;
- PRF keys.
The PRF seeds class ( Fig. 5.20 ) represents the two seeds K1 and K2 of the
ACF-e cient PRF; it contains:
two C++ pair elements, each one representing a seed (K1 and K2) and con-
taining a couple of array of bytes ({k1, k01} for K1 and {k2, k02} for K2);
an additional constructor receiving as parameter such pair elements;
a classic get function for each seed (pair) to retrieve.
1 class PRF_seeds{
2 public:
3 PRF_seeds();
4 PRF_seeds(const pair<const byte*,const byte*>& K1_, const
pair<const byte*,const byte*>& K2_);
5 PRF_seeds(const PRF_seeds& copy);
6 PRF_seeds& operator= (const PRF_seeds& copy);
7 ~PRF_seeds();
8 pair<const byte*,const byte*> get_K1() const;
9 pair<const byte*,const byte*> get_K2() const;
10 private:
11 pair<const byte*,const byte*> K1;
12 pair<const byte*,const byte*> K2;
13 };
Figure 5.20: PRF seeds class
.
The PRF parameters class ( Fig. 5.21) represents the additional parameters
required by the ACF-e cient PRF to execute the computation; recall from the Sec.
3.3.3.1 that the ACF-e cient PRF needs also other parameters like the primes p
and q, the product N , the bit-size k of every message to encode, the bit-size of the
AES key, the bit-size of the message digest, etc.; therefore it contains:
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all such necessary parameters (almost all NTL ZZ objects plus some int or
long elements);
an additional constructor receiving as parameter such elements;
a classic get function for each value to retrieve.
1 class PRF_parameters{
2 public:
3 PRF_parameters();
4 PRF_parameters(long RSA_sec_param_, const ZZ& N_, const ZZ&
p_prime_,const ZZ& q_prime_, const ZZ& p_, const ZZ& q_, const
ZZ& two_to_the_k_,const ZZ& g_, int aes_key_byte_size_, int
sha3_digest_byte_size_);
5 PRF_parameters(const PRF_parameters& copy);
6 PRF_parameters& operator= (const PRF_parameters& copy);
7 ~PRF_parameters();
8 long get_RSA_sec_param() const;
9 ZZ get_N() const;
10 ZZ get_p_prime() const;
11 ZZ get_q_prime() const;
12 ZZ get_p() const;
13 ZZ get_q() const;
14 ZZ get_two_to_the_k() const;
15 ZZ get_g() const;
16 int get_aes_key_byte_size() const;
17 int get_sha3_digest_byte_size() const;
18 private:
19 long RSA_sec_param;
20 ZZ N, p_prime,q_prime,p,q,two_to_the_k,g;
21 int aes_key_byte_size, sha3_digest_byte_size;
22 };
Figure 5.21: PRF parameters class
.
The PRF keys class ( Fig. 5.22) is somehow a wrapper class that contains:
two objects: a PRF seeds object and a PRF parameters object;
an additional constructor receiving as parameter such two objects;
a classic get function for each object to retrieve.
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1 class PRF_keys{
2 public:
3 PRF_keys();
4 PRF_keys(const PRF_parameters& prf_params,const PRF_seeds&
prf_seeds_);
5 PRF_keys(const PRF_keys& copy);
6 PRF_keys& operator= (const PRF_keys& copy);
7 ~PRF_keys();
8 PRF_seeds get_PRF_seeds();
9 PRF_parameters get_PRF_parameters() const;
10 PRF_seeds get_PRF_seeds() const;
11 private:
12 PRF_parameters prf_params;
13 PRF_seeds prf_seeds;
14 };
Figure 5.22: PRF keys class
.
The reason for which it has been choice this configuration is that, in general,
one can choose to use a PRF object without caring about the generation of the seeds
and/or of the other parameters; one can assume that maybe there exists someone
in charge of output all the necessary keys, parameters, and than to pass them to
the PRF object. In other words, if an user wants to employ the PRF, can decide to
generate all the keys necessary by itself or just demand the task to someone else.
Moreover, the composed PRF keys object allows to demand the generation of only
one part of the components (PRF seeds or PRF parameters) required by the PRF
object or of both parts. Once again, the goal is to increase the modularity.
An object of the PRF class ( Fig. 5.23) represents an ACF-e cient PRF, so
it contains a compute method that is the method that executes the F0K1(⌧) and
F0K2( ) of the description in Sec. 3.3.3.1. PRF contains the constructor that receives a
PRF keys object, i.e. the parameters and the seeds, but it also contains an additional
constructor that receives only a PRF parameters object; in this case inside such
constructor will be built the seeds. In order to guarantee the e ciency property, the
PRF provides also two methods CFEval off and CFEval on that carry out the rule
of the two equivalent methods seen always in Sec. 3.3.3.1.
In the following paragraphs I will describe all the methods of the PRF class,
showing the parts of the code more significant.
ACF-efficient PRF keys generation
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1 class PRF{
2 public:
3 PRF();
4 PRF(const PRF_keys& prf_keys_); //keys = paramaeters + seeds for aes
5 PRF(const PRF_parameters& prf_params); //only parameters, the
constructor builds the seeds
6 PRF(const PRF& copy);
7 PRF& operator= (const PRF& copy);
8 ~PRF();
9 ZZ compute(const Label& delta, const Label& tau);
10 ZZ CFEval_off(const Program& program);
11 ZZ CFEval_on(const Label& delta, const ZZ& w_f);
12 private:
13 ZZ N,p_prime,q_prime,p,q,two_to_the_k,g;
14 long RSA_sec_param;
15 PRF_seeds prf_seeds;
16 long PRF_output_byte_size;
17 const byte* k1, k1_prime, k2, k2_prime;
18 int aes_key_byte_size;
19 int sha3_digest_byte_size;
20 SHA3_256 hash, kash2;
21 ECB_Mode< AES >::Encryption encryptor, encryptor3;
22 CTR_Mode< AES >::Encryption encryptor2, encryptor4;
23 bool destroy;
24 };
Figure 5.23: PRF keys class
.
The Fig. 5.24 shows part of the code of the generation of the keys of the ACF-
e cient PRF inside one of the constructor of the PRF class. Actually, the code shows
just the generation of the seeds, because the parameters are generated inside the
KeyGen function of the framework, as we will see later on.
The code is quite self-explanatory; there is a switch to determine the bit-size
of the AES key and of the message digest of the hash function, depending on the
security parameter. Regarding the hash function, it has been chosen the SHA-3
(Keccak)4, added in the version 5.6.2 of Crypto++.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-3
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1 //...
2 const byte* k1;
3 const byte* k1_prime;
4 const byte* k2;
5 const byte* k2_prime;
6 AutoSeededRandomPool xRng;
7 switch(RSA_sec_param){
8 case(80): //aes128
9 aes_key_byte_size=16;
10 sha3_digest_byte_size=32;
11 break;
12 case(128): //aes128
13 aes_key_byte_size=16;
14 sha3_digest_byte_size=32;
15 break;
16 case(256): //aes256
17 //...
18 default: //aes128
19 //...
20 }
21 //building seeds
22 k1 = new byte[aes_key_byte_size];
23 k1_prime= new byte[aes_key_byte_size];
24 k2 = new byte[aes_key_byte_size];
25 k2_prime = new byte[aes_key_byte_size];
26 xRng.GenerateBlock(const_cast<byte*>(k1), aes_key_byte_size);
27 xRng.GenerateBlock(const_cast<byte*>(k1_prime), aes_key_byte_size);
28 xRng.GenerateBlock(const_cast<byte*>(k2), aes_key_byte_size);
29 xRng.GenerateBlock(const_cast<byte*>(k2_prime), aes_key_byte_size);
30 PRF_output_byte_size=NumBytes(operator*(p_prime,
q_prime))+(RSA_sec_param/8);
31 destroy=true;
32 //...
Figure 5.24: Part of the constructor of the PRF class that receives only the
PRF parameters as parameter.
The code in Fig. 5.24 randomly fills the byte arrays (seeds) using a
RandomNumberGenerator of Crypto++ that is AutoSeededRandomPool and that is
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an AutoSeeded generator, i.e. it does not require a seed.5. Than the bit-size of the
ACF-e cient PRF output is set following the Lemma 5.1. The last code line is just
a simple solution to avoid C++ memory problems; indeed in the case in which the
above constructor is called, the C++ new operator is called several times to create
the seeds; therefore we need to set this boolean flag destroy so that inside the
destructor we can correctly free the memory. This artifice is necessary because in
the case in which the other PRF class constructor (that receives all the keys, so also
the seeds) is called, there is no memory to free (because the C++ new operator is
not employed).
ACF-efficient PRF compute() function
The Compute() function essentially implements the FK( , ⌧) seen in Sec. 3.3.3.1.
This method takes as parameters two Label objects,   and ⌧ . The Compute() func-
tion inside the PRF class describes the implementation of the theoretical construction
of the ACF-e cient PRF seen in the previous section, considering the case of the
security parameter equal to 80. The Fig. 5.25 shows the part of the code of the
Compute() function related to the hash function.
1 SHA3_256 hash;
2 //input string for the hashing
3 string delta_string=delta.to_string();
4 //output of the hashing and input of aes
5 byte aes_input_bytes[sha3_digest_byte_size];
6 hash.CalculateDigest(aes_input_bytes, (byte*) delta_string.c_str(),
delta_string.length());
Figure 5.25: Hashing of the the string  
The hash variable is an object of the Cryptop++ SHA3 256 class and it outputs
the message digest. After that, there is the AES cascade mode.
The cascade method has been realized by implementing a for cycle within which it
is called the function void cascade mode(const byte* key, byte* input, byte*
output) Fig. 5.26; this function takes as parameters the key, the input bytes and
the output bytes of each round of the cascade mode.
5Refer to http://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/RandomNumberGenerator for more details
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1 void PRF:: cascade_mode(const byte* key, byte* input, byte* output)
2 {
3 ECB_Mode< AES >::Encryption encryptor;
4 encryptor.SetKey(key, aes_key_byte_size);
5 encryptor.ProcessData(output,input,AES::BLOCKSIZE);
6 }
Figure 5.26: AES cascade mode (ECB mode)
In Cryptop++, when we use symmetric ciphers, we have to choose a cipher and
a mode. When we choose a mode, we can use it in one of two ways in Crypto++.
The first method uses the cipher as a templated parameter. The second method
uses external cipher objects. They are quite equivalent; in the Fig. 5.26, the block
cipher (AES) is a templated parameter to the mode object (ECB) - it holds an
instance of the cipher object. Next, we set the key and we push the bytes block in
for encryption. Finally we use ProcessData() to encrypt the plain text, since it
allows us to receive the result in a single line of code.
Even the counter mode has been implemented by using another function, string
ctr mode(const byte* key, const byte* final 16 byte aes output) Fig. 5.27,
called by the compute function. It takes as parameters the key (second value of the
pair K1 and K2) and the input for the CTR mode that is the output of the cascade
mode, and it returns the final string to convert to the NTL ZZ integer.
The ctr mode() function code in Fig. 5.27 deserves a little extra explanation.
Block ciphers, such as DES and AES, can be made to appear like a stream cipher
if we use a Crypto++ adapter called a StreamTransformationFilter. We do this
because the filter handles bu↵ering, blocking, and padding for us. In short, it makes
it easier to use the library. Crypto++ uses a Unix pipelining paradigm: data flows
from source to a destination.
Above, we start with a StringSource, and end with a StringSink. The filters
in between perform the bu↵ering, blocking, and padding. If we were to visualize the
block diagram of a system using a StreamTransformationFilter, it would be as
shown in figure Fig. 5.28. Note that the BufferedTransformation argument to the
StreamTransformationFilter is the Encryptor object. BufferedTransformation
is the base class of the Encryptor and the Decryptor.
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1 string PRF:: ctr_mode(const byte* key, const byte*
final_16_byte_aes_output)
2 {
3 CTR_Mode< AES >::Encryption encryptor;
4 //AES Counter mode to obtain the final number
5 byte counter [AES::BLOCKSIZE];
6 memcpy (counter, final_16_byte_aes_output,
sizeof(byte)*AES::BLOCKSIZE);
7 string message;
8 message.assign(PRF_output_byte_size,’0’);
9 encryptor.SetKeyWithIV(key, aes_key_byte_size, counter);
10 string output; //the output bytes of the pseudorandom function
11 StringSource(message, true, new
StreamTransformationFilter(encryptor,new
StringSink(output)));
12 return output;
13 }
Figure 5.27: AES Counter mode
Figure 5.28: StreamTransformationFilter data flow.
Finally, the AES CTR mode output is converted in a NTL ZZ object by using the
NTL ZZ function; by applying the module operator one finally obtains the output
of the ACF-e cient PRF.
Inside the compute() function, the sequence of functions cascade mode-ctr mode
is called for both strings, delta and ⌧ .
CFEval off() function of the ACF-efficient PRF
The CFEval off() function is the implementation of the CFEvalo↵⌧ (K, f) algo-
rithm presented in the description of the ACF-e cient PRF in Sec. 3.3.3.1. The
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function takes as parameter a Program object. Fig. 5.29 shows the code of the im-
plementation. First it is recovered the number of coe cients of the function (inside
the Program) that has to be computed; than, for each ⌧i inside the Program the
ACF-e cient PRF is computed as seen before and the function (w f) is computed
over all the PRF values (the function is a linear combination so it is enough to
multiply every coe cient of the function for the correspondent value outputted by
the ACF-e cient PRF).
1 ZZ PRF:: CFEval_off(const Program& program){
2 ZZ w_f(0); //value to return
3 FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function funct(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function&>(program.get_function()));
4 int coefficients=funct.get_coefficients_number();
5 int n;
6 ZZ vi; //output of the pseudorandom function
7 for(n=0;n<coefficients;n++){
8 //computing the PRF for each string "tau_i" inside
"program"
9 //as seen in the Compute() function
10 string output; //output of the PRF
11 ZZ vi;
12 ZZFromBytes(vi, (unsigned char*)output.c_str(),
output.size());
13 operator%=(vi, operator*(p_prime, q_prime));
14 AddMod(w_f, w_f,
MulMod(vi,funct.get_coefficient(n),operator*(p_prime,
q_prime)), operator*(p_prime, q_prime));
15 }
16 return w_f;
17 }
Figure 5.29: CFEval off() function inside the PRF class
.
CFEval on() function of ACF-efficient PRF
The CFEval on() function is the implementation of the CFEvalon  (K,!f ) algo-
rithm presented in the description of the ACF-e cient PRF in Sec. 3.3.3.1. The
function takes as parameter a Label object and the output of the CFEval off()
function. Fig. 5.30 shows the code of the implementation. The function simply
computes the ACF-e cient PRF of the string  , b and than use such value to return
W = gwf ·b (see Sec. 3.3.3.1 to recall what g is).
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1 ZZ PRF:: CFEval_on(const Label& delta,const ZZ& w_f){
2 ZZ W(0); //value to return
3 //computing the PRF of "delta"
4 //as seen in the Compute() function
5 string output; //output of the PRF
6 ZZ b;
7 ZZFromBytes(b, (unsigned char*)output.c_str(), output.size());
8 operator%=(b, operator*(p_prime, q_prime));
9 PowerMod(W, g, operator*(w_f,b), N);
10 return W;
11 }
Figure 5.30: CFEval on() function inside the PRF class
.
5.2.2 Implementation of the scheme’s algorithms
As already made for the Joye-Libert cryptosystem implementation, I will show which
classes of the framework have been extended and which simply used as they are. For
the implementation of the Outsourcinglin ( Sec. 3.3.3.2 ) the framework has been
employed in all its totality.
Starting from the classes representing the keys, ComputKey, DecodKey, cmdEn-
codKey and OnDecodKey have been of course all extended; we can call the derived
classes FGP 14 lin funct EncodKey, FGP 14 lin funct ComputKey,
FGP 14 lin funct DecodKey and FGP 14 lin funct OnDecodKey. Each of them ba-
sically contains all the parameters required to execute the correspondent algorithms,
so i.e. the FGP 14 lin funct ComputKey will contain just an NTL ZZ object repre-
senting the composite N , while the FGP 14 lin funct ComputKey will contain the
k message bit-size, the N , y, ↵ parameters (all NTL ZZ objects) and a PRF keys
parameter (recall that the Encode algorithm of the scheme needs to use the ACF-
e cient PRF); all the above classes include as always an additional constructor to
set all the necessary parameters and a typical get function for each variable to
retrieve.
The other classes of the framework that have been inherited are Encoding,
Message and Program function. We can call the derived classes
FGP 14 lin funct Encoding, FGP 14 lin funct Message,
FGP 14 lin funct Program function.
The FGP 14 lin funct Encoding represents and encoding element and, follow-
ing the scheme in Sec. 3.3.3.2, it consists of a couple of element, a ciphertext and
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a tag, that becomes a couple of NTL ZZ objects; the class provides the additional
constructor to set these objects and the classic get function to recover them.
The FGP 14 lin funct Message is sostantially the same of the Joye-Libert cryp-
tosystem implementation. It contains an NTL ZZ object where to store the value to
encrypt, an additional constructor receiving as parameter directly a NTL ZZ object
representing the value to encrypt, an additional constructor receiving as parameter
a long representing the bit size of the integer to encrypt (in this case, inside the
constructor it will be called an other function of the class to generate a random
NTL ZZ integer of the right size representing the value to encrypt) and a classic get
function to retrieve the NTL ZZ object value.
The FGP 14 lin funct Program funcion contains the linear function in the
form of a vector of coe cients (NTL ZZ objects). Actually the additional con-
structor takes as parameter also an int element representing the number of ⌧i labels
contained in the Program; the reason is that when we pass to the constructor the
vector of coe cients of the function we perform a check to verify that the number
of coe cients is equal to the number of ⌧i. The class provides several utility func-
tions to retrieve the entire function (vector of NTL ZZ objects), only a coe cient
(NTL ZZ object) or just a vector coe cient index (int).
The Outsourcinglin key generation
The first step is to implement the KeyGen algorithm of the Outsourcinglin scheme. As
already made for the Joye-Libert(JL) cryptosytem implementation, what we need
is to implement the KeyGen virtual function of the SchemeKeyGen “interface” of the
framework. For this reason, one can create a concrete class, i.e. called
FGP14 lin funct SchemeKeyGen, in which define a body for the KeyGen virtual
function.
Regarding this class, there is actually not much to say. Reviewing the KeyGen
algorithm in Sec. 3.3.3.2, we can see that many of the parameters generate by
this algorithm are essentially the same for the Outsourcinglin scheme and for the
ACF-e cient PRF (a part from the seeds of the ACF-e cient PRF); moreover the
parameters of the Outsourcinglin scheme are almost the same of the Joye-Libert keys
generation. Actually, there are only two di↵erences: in the Outsourcinglin the two
primes p and q are k-quasi-safe primes while in JL, p,q ⌘ 1 (mod 2k); this implies
a little modification in the generation algorithms of p and q; the other di↵erence is
represented by the generator g not present in JL. Therefore, to obtain the code of the
KeyGen inside the FGP14 lin funct SchemeKeyGen class, it is enough to consider the
key generation code described for the Joye-Libert keys generation implementation
and simply modify it ( Fig. 5.31 and Fig. 5.32) and add the code showed in the
ACF-e cient PRF key generation to build the seeds.
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1 long bit_size_p_q_prime =(N_factoring_sec_par_bit_size/2) -
k_message_bit_size;
2 ZZ p,p_prime;
3 GenPrime(p_prime, bit_size_p_q_prime, RSA_sec_param);
4 while(!ProbPrime(two_to_the_k*p_prime+1,miller_rabin_tests)){
5 GenPrime(p_prime, bit_size_p_q_prime, RSA_sec_param);
6 };
7 p=two_to_the_k*p_prime+1;
8 ZZ q,q_prime;
9 GenPrime(q_prime, bit_size_p_q_prime, RSA_sec_param);
10 while(!ProbPrime(two_to_the_k*q_prime+1,miller_rabin_tests)){
11 GenPrime(q_prime, bit_size_p_q_prime, RSA_sec_param);
12 };
13 q=two_to_the_k*q_prime+1;
Figure 5.31: k-quasi-safe primes generation
.
How it is possible see from the Fig. 5.31, here, instead of using the RandomLen
function of NTL ZZ, we use the void GenPrime(ZZ& n, long l, long err); NTL
ZZ function because we need that p0 and q0 are also primes. Indeed, such function
generates a random prime n of length l so that the probability that the resulting n
is composite is bounded by 2 err.
In the Fig. 5.32, the algorithm picks a random element x 2 Z⇤N , then computes
y = x2
k
and evaluates t1 = yp
0
, t2 = yq
0
; if t1 /= 1 and t2 /= 1 we go out from the
while and we set the generator g = x2
k
, otherwise we continue the research.
The procedure remains the same: the KeyGen virtual function has the task of
generating all the keys for the encoding, computing and decoding phase, using them
to build the Keys object that will be returned by the function. Fig. 5.33 shows just
the last part of the code in which the keys are built and stored in the Keys object.
The Outsourcinglin o✏ine decoding
If we consider the description of the Outsourcinglin scheme in presence of the ACF-
e ciency property, the only di↵erent thing in the KeyGen algorithm consists of
the use of the o✏ine closed-form e cient algorithm of the PRF. Recalling the
structure of the framework, the ACF-e ciency property has been modelled us-
ing the two ABCs SchemeOfflineDecode and SchemeOnlineDecode; so we need
to implement the OfflineDecode virtual function of the SchemeOfflineDecode
“interface” of the framework. For this reason, one can create a concrete class,
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1 ZZ x,x_two_k,x_two_k_p_prime,x_two_k_q_prime,g;
2 do{
3 x_two_k_p_prime=0;
4 x_two_k_q_prime=0;
5 do{
6 RandomBnd(x,N);
7 gcd=GCD(x,N);
8 }
9 while(gcd!=1);
10 PowerMod(x_two_k,x,two_to_the_k,N);
11 PowerMod(x_two_k_p_prime,x_two_k%p_prime,p_prime,p_prime);
12 PowerMod(x_two_k_q_prime,x_two_k%q_prime,q_prime,q_prime);
13 }
14 while(x_two_k_p_prime==1 or x_two_k_q_prime==1);
15 PowerMod(g,x,two_to_the_k,N);
Figure 5.32: Generation of the generator g of the subgroup of Z⇤N ,
Rk = {x2k : x 2 Z⇤N}
.
i.e. called FGP14 lin funct SchemeOfflineDeode, in which define a body for the
OfflineDecode virtual function. Inside such function it will be su cient to create a
PRF object passing it the PRF keys (contained in the FGP 14 lin funct DecodKey)
and then call the CFEval off() of the PRF class ( Fig.5.34)
The Outsourcinglin encoding
Following the description of the Outsourcinglin scheme, the next step is to implement
the Encode algorithm. As already made for the Joye-Libert cryptosytem implemen-
tation, we have to implement the Encode virtual function of the SchemeEncode
“interface” of the framework. For this reason, one can create a concrete class, i.e.
called FGP14 lin funct SchemeEncode, in which define a body for the Encode vir-
tual function.
Even in this case there is no much to say because the algorithm simply encrypts a
valuem (the code is the same described in the Joye-Libert encoding implementation)
to produce a ciphertext for the FGP 14 lin funct Encoding and then it uses the
compute() function of the PRF class to obtain the value to create the tag for the
FGP 14 lin funct Encoding ( Fig.5.35)
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1 //generation of all the parameters
2 ...
3 //building the pseudorandom function parameters
4 PRF_parameters
prf_params(RSA_sec_param,N,p_prime,q_prime,p,q,two_to_the_k,g,
aes_key_byte_size,sha3_digest_byte_size);
5 //pseudorandom function seeds
6 pair<const byte*,const byte*> K1(k1,k1_prime);
7 pair<const byte*,const byte*> K2(k2,k2_prime);
8 //building the pseudorandom function keys (parameters + seeds)
9 PRF_seeds prf_seeds(K1,K2);
10 PRF_keys prf_keys(prf_params,prf_seeds);
11 //building all the keys (to encode, compute and decode)
12 FGP_14_lin_funct_EncodKey* encodKey = new
FGP_14_lin_funct_EncodKey(k_message_bit_size,N,y,alpha,prf_keys);
13 FGP_14_lin_funct_ComputKey* computKey= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_ComputKey(N);
14 FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey* decodKey= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey(p,p_prime,y,k_message_bit_size,N,alpha,prf_keys);
15 Keys* keys= new Keys(encodKey,computKey,decodKey);
16 return keys;
Figure 5.33: Final part of the KeyGen function code inside the
FGP14 lin funct SchemeKeyGen class
.
The Outsourcinglin computation
The Compute algorithm of the Outsourcinglin scheme is not present in the Joye-
Libert implementation. In this case we need to implement also the Compute virtual
function of the SchemeCompute “interface” of the framework. Again, one can create
a concrete class, i.e. called FGP14 lin funct SchemeCompute, in which define a
body for the Compute virtual function.
The code is self-explanatory ( Fig.5.36); it simply follows the description given
in Sec. 3.3.3.2.
The Outsourcinglin decoding
Regarding the Decode algorithm of the Outsourcinglin scheme, we have to make a
distinction between the case in presence of the ACF-e ciency property and that
without such property.
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1 OnlineDecodKey* FGP_14_lin_funct_User:: OfflineDecode(const DecodKey&
decodKey, const Program& prog)
2 {
3 OnlineDecodKey* onlineDecodKey=NULL;
4 FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey FGP_decodKey(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey&>(decodKey));
5 PRF my_prf(FGP_decodKey.get_prf_keys());
6
7 ZZ w_f=my_prf.CFEval_off(prog);
8
9 FGP_14_lin_funct_OnDecodKey ondecodkey(w_f);
10
11 onlineDecodKey= new OnlineDecodKey(decodKey,ondecodkey);
12 return onlineDecodKey;
13 }
Figure 5.34: OfflineDecode function code inside the
FGP14 lin funct SchemeOfflineDecode class
.
1 Encoding* FGP_14_lin_funct_User:: Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const
Label& delta, const Label& tau_i, const Message& message)
2 {
3 FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding* encoding=NULL;
4 ZZ c_i;
5 ZZ prf_output=my_prf.compute(delta,tau_i);
6 ZZ c_alpha,t_i;
7 PowerMod(c_alpha,c_i,alpha,N);
8 t_i = MulMod(c_alpha,prf_output,N);
9 encoding = new FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding(c_i,t_i);
10 return encoding;
11 }
Figure 5.35: Encode function code inside the FGP14 lin funct SchemeEncode class
.
As always, we need to implement the Decode virtual function of the SchemeDecode
“interface” of the framework and the OnlineDecode virtual function of the
SchemeOnlineDecode “interface” of the framework. Again, one can create two con-
crete classes, i.e. called FGP14 lin funct SchemeDecode, in which define a body for
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1 Encoding* FGP_14_lin_funct_User:: Encode(const EncodKey& encKey, const
Label& delta, const Label& tau_i, const Message& message){
2 FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding* encoding=NULL;
3 FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function function(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function&>(funct));
4 ZZ N=(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_ComputKey&>(compKey)).get_N();
5 int coefficients=function.get_coefficients_number();
6 if(coefficients!=(int)vec.get_vector_size()){
7 cout << "\nError";
8 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
9 }
10 ZZ c(1),t(1),fi(0);
11 int n;
12 ZZ c_i,t_i;
13 FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding* enc;
14 for(n=0;n<coefficients;n++) {
15 fi=function.get_coefficient(n);
16 enc=(dynamic_cast<FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding*>(
vec.get_Encoding(n)) );
17 c_i=enc->get_Ciphertext();
18 t_i=enc->get_Tag();
19 MulMod(c,c,PowerMod(c_i,fi,N),N);
20 MulMod(t,t,PowerMod(t_i,fi,N),N);
21 }
22 encoding = new FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding(c,t);
23 return encoding;
24 }
Figure 5.36: Compute function code inside the FGP14 lin funct SchemeCompute
class
.
the Decode virtual function, and FGP14 lin funct SchemeOnlineDecode, in which
define a body for the SchemeOnlineDecode virtual function.
The code for the Decode function implementation is showed in Fig.5.37. In the
first stage, for each ⌧i label inside the Program we call the compute() function of the
PRF function. Than, all these values are used to compute the product W ; once that
the equation to set the acceptance bit is verified, if the acceptance bit is 1 we can
decrypt the ciphertext contained in the encoding produced by the Compute function.
The decryption algorithm code is the same seen for the Joye-Libert implementation.
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The code for the OnlineDecode function implementation is showed in Fig.5.38.
Here the code is even simpler; instead of compute a PRF for each ⌧i inside the
Program, it is simply call the CFEval on() function of the PRF class using the
FGP 14 lin funct OnDecodKey inside the OnlineDecodKey produced by the
OfflineDecode function. Than, the value W outputted by the PRF is used to
compute the equation that has to be verified to set the acceptance bit; if the ac-
ceptance bit is 1 we can decrypt the ciphertext contained in the encoding produced
by the Compute function. The decryption algorithm code is the same seen for the
Joye-Libert implementation.
Final remarks
We conclude this section with a last comment. The Outsourcinglin scheme im-
plementation is an implementation in which every algorithm of the Outsourcinglin
scheme has its correspondent class in the implementation (KeyGen()$
FGP 14 lin funct SchemeKeyGen, Encode()$ FGP 14 lin funct SchemeEcode, etc.)
providing in this way a one-to-one correspondence. This is, clearly, not the only pos-
sible solution. Another approach could be that in which one creates a class User that
implements more than one ABC of the framework, i.e. the SchemeEncode and the
SchemeDecode, and a class Server that implements the SchemeCompute ABC. This
observation suggests that there are many way to employ the framework, combining
the interfaces in the way that better fits with the own scheme.
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1 Decoding* FGP_14_lin_funct_User:: Decode(const DecodKey& decodKey,
const Program& prog, const Label& delta, const Encoding& encod){
2 Decoding* decoding=NULL;
3 FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey FGP_decodKey(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey&>(decodKey));
4 FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding FGP_encoding(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding&>(encod));
5 FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function function(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_Program_function&>(prog.get_function()));
6 ZZ alpha,N,ct;
7 alpha = FGP_decodKey.get_alpha();
8 N = FGP_decodKey.get_N();
9 c=FGP_encoding.get_Ciphertext();
10 t=FGP_encoding.get_Tag();
11 PRF my_prf(FGP_decodKey.get_prf_keys());
12 ZZ W_i,W(1);
13 int coefficients=function.get_coefficients_number();
14 int n;
15 for(n=0;n<coefficients;n++) {
16 W_i=my_prf.compute(delta,prog.get_tau(n));
17 MulMod(W,W,PowerMod(W_i,function.get_coefficient(n),N),N);
18 }
19 ZZ c_to_the_alpha_times_W=MulMod(PowerMod(c,alpha,N), W, N);
20 if((operator==(t,c_to_the_alpha_times_W))==1) {
21 //decryption algorithm
22 ...
23 ZZ m; //decrypted value
24 FGP_14_lin_funct_Message* mess= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_Message(m);
25 decoding= new Decoding(true,mess);
26 }
27 else {
28 ZZ empty(0);
29 FGP_14_lin_funct_Message* mess= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_Message(empty);
30 decoding= new Decoding(false,mess);
31 }
32 return decoding;
33 }
Figure 5.37: Decode function code inside the FGP14 lin funct SchemeDecode class
.
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1 Decoding* FGP_14_lin_funct_User:: OnlineDecode(const OnlineDecodKey&
onlineDecodKey, const Label& delta, const Encoding& encod){
2 Decoding* decoding=NULL;
3 FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding FGP_encoding(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_Encoding&>(encod));
4 FGP_14_lin_funct_OnDecodKey FGP_on_decodKey(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_OnDecodKey&>(onlineDecodKey.get_OnDecodKey()));
5 FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey FGP_decodKey(dynamic_cast<const
FGP_14_lin_funct_DecodKey&>(onlineDecodKey.get_DecodKey()));
6 ZZ w_f= FGP_on_decodKey.get_w_f();
7 ZZ alpha = FGP_decodKey.get_alpha();
8 ZZ N = FGP_decodKey.get_N();
9 ZZ c=FGP_encoding.get_Ciphertext();
10 ZZ t=FGP_encoding.get_Tag();
11 PRF my_prf(FGP_decodKey.get_prf_keys());
12 ZZ W=my_prf.CFEval_on(delta,w_f);
13 ZZ c_to_the_alpha_times_W=MulMod(PowerMod(c,alpha,N), W, N);
14 if((operator==(t,c_to_the_alpha_times_W))==1){
15 //decryption algorithm
16 //...
17 ZZ m; //decrypted value
18 FGP_14_lin_funct_Message* mess= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_Message(m);
19 decoding= new Decoding(true,mess);
20 }
21 else {
22 ZZ empty(0);
23 FGP_14_lin_funct_Message* mess= new
FGP_14_lin_funct_Message(empty);
24 decoding= new Decoding(false,mess);
25 }
26 return decoding;
27 }
Figure 5.38: OnlineDecode function code inside the
FGP14 lin funct SchemeOnlineDecode class
.
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Chapter 6
Experiments
In this chapter we show some timing performances related to several experiments
we performed using the implementations described in the previous chapter.
Following the content of the chapter, the Sec. 6.1 is dedicated to the experiments
about the Joye-libert cryptosystem. We show the timing performances of all the
algorithms, considering di↵erent configurations of parameters. In the Sec. 6.2 we
present the experiments about the Outsourcinglin scheme. Even in this case we show
the timing performances of all the algorithms involved in the scheme.
Recalling the considerations made in the last part of Sec. 5.1.2 about the con-
straints related to the bit-size k of the message to encrypt, related to the security
parameter and to the bit size of the composed number N , we decided to perform
the following experiments:
with security parameter   = 80 and bit-size of the message k = 128;
with security parameter   = 128 and bit-size of the message k = 128;
with security parameter   = 128 and bit-size of the message k = 128;
with security parameter   = 128 and bit-size of the message k = 128
The experiments have been done on a Intel Core i7-3610QM (2.30 GHz, 6 MB L3
cache, 4 cores, 8GB RAM DDR3) machine, with Operating System Ubuntu 12.04
LTS 64 bit.
The resulting timings shown in the following sections represent the average values
over multiple iterations (depending on the algorithm in exam) for each experiment.
Actually, we will also show the standard deviations.
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6.1 Experiments about the implementation of the
Joye-Libert cryptosystem
This section is dedicated to the description of the experiments related to the imple-
mentation of the Joye-Libert linear homomorphic encryption scheme.
6.1.1 Key generation
From the table it is possible to see that most of the Key generation time is spent
for the generation of the prime numbers.
We provide the results over sets of 100 iterations for each experiment.
Table 6.1 shows the experiments, describing the resulting timings in millisec-
onds.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Key Generation 80 128 9.317 5.079
Primes generation 80 128 9.035 5.089
Remaining part 80 128 0.281 0.272
Key Generation 128 128 284.090 195.570
Primes generation 128 128 284.059 195.525
Remaining part 128 128 0.031 0.313
Key Generation 128 256 258.916 173.334
Primes generation 128 256 258.853 173.377
Remaining part 128 256 0.063 0.442
Key Generation 128 512 272.941 165.233
Primes generation 128 512 271.941 165.197
Remaining part 128 512 0.999 1.106
Table 6.1: Key Generation algorithm and its sub-parts in milliseconds.
6.1.2 Encoding (encryption)
The second algorithm we analyze is the encoding algorithm.
We provide the results over sets of 100 iterations for each experiment. We also
consider two cases:
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(a) messages randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1};
(b) random messages of 32 bits.
Table 6.2 shows the experiments for the case (a) while Table 6.3 shows the
experiments for the case (b) . In both cases, the resulting timings are expressed in
milliseconds.
  k Average(ms) Standard deviation(ms)
80 128 0.258 0.025
128 128 1.411 0.032
128 256 2.673 0.068
128 512 5.041 0.399
Table 6.2: Encoding (encryption) of messages randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1}.
Results in milliseconds.
  k Average(ms) Standard deviation(ms)
80 128 0.150 0.030
128 128 0.615 0.383
128 256 1.447 0.024
128 512 2.604 0.052
Table 6.3: Encoding (encryption) of random messages of 32 bits. Results in
milliseconds.
6.1.3 Computation
The third algorithm we analyze is the compute algorithm. For the experiments,
we consider the composition of the two basic functions Add and CMult presented
in the Eval algorithm of the Joye-libert encryption scheme. Namely, given a set
a= (a1, ..., an) of n random elements belonging to the message space, and considering
n ciphertexts, c=(c1, ..., cn) the function f we chose outputs c
a1
1 · ca22 , ..., cann .
We perform 10 iterations for each experiment, varying the number n of coe -
cients and ciphertexts, chosing n equal to 1000, 10000, 100000. The function coe -
cients and the ciphertexts are randomly picked, at each iteration, in {0, ...,2k   1}.
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Table 6.4 shows the experiments, describing the resulting timings in seconds.
n   k Average(s) Standard deviation(s)
1000 80 128 0.105 0.003
10000 80 128 1.018 0.012
100000 80 128 10.403 0.241
1000 128 128 0.733 0.0062
10000 128 128 7.244 0.084
100000 128 128 107.798 0.767
1000 128 256 1.424 0.014
10000 128 256 19.670 2.706
100000 128 256 141.153 1.2
1000 128 512 2.766 0.021
10000 128 512 38.188 3.46
100000 128 512 0 0
Table 6.4: Compute algorithm in seconds.
6.1.4 Decoding (decryption)
The last algorithm we analyze is the decode (decryption) algorithm. Here we com-
pare the resulting timings of the best decryption algorithm presented by Joye and
Libert in [18] and the resulting timings of our new decryption algorithm. Even in
this case, we provide the results over sets of 100 iterations for each experiment. We
also consider the cases:
(a) messages randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1};
(b) random messages of 32 bits.
Table 6.5 shows the experiments for the case (a) while Table 6.6 shows the
experiments for the case (b) .
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  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 80 128 2.245 0.112
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 80 128 1.469 0.149
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 128 13.596 0.280
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 128 8.880 0.646
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 256 47.255 0.905
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 256 28.768 1.651
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 512 180.376 2.038
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 512 107.821 6.012
Table 6.5: Decoding (decryption) of messages randomly picked 2 {0, ...,2k   1}.
Results in milliseconds.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 80 128 1.623 0.870
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 80 128 0.649 0.366
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 128 13.192 0.279
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 128 5.359 0.522
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 256 43.087 0.637
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 256 8.83 1.076
Joye-Libert ( Alg. 3.5 ) 128 512 161.095 2.006
Our alg. ( Alg. 3.7 ) 128 512 15.637 2.389
Table 6.6: Decoding (decryption) of random messages of 32 bits. Results in
milliseconds.
6.2 Experiments about the implementation of the
Outsourcinglin scheme
This section is dedicated to the description of the experiments related to the the
implementation of the Outsourcinglin scheme.
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6.2.1 Key generation
The first algorithm we analyze is the key generation algorithm. In this case, we
consider the resulting timings of the complete Key Generation algorithm and the it
sub-parts:
prime numbers generation;
PRF key generation;
remaining part.
Recall that the key generation algorithm of the Outsourcinglin scheme has to
produce two k-quasi-safe primes, so the time required is higher. we provide the
results over sets of 10 iterations for each experiment. Table 6.7 shows the experiments
in seconds.
  k Average (s) Standard deviation (s)
Key Generation 80 128 1.723 0.555
Primes generation 80 128 1.722 0.555
PRF key generation 80 128 0.0005 0.00007
Remaining part 80 128 0.0004 0.0003
Key Generation 128 128 152.963 132.948
Primes generation 128 128 152.656 132.948
PRF key generation 128 128 0.005 0.0008
Remaining part 128 128 0.0013 0.0007
Key Generation 128 256 185.085 164.070
Primes generation 128 256 185.078 164.070
PRF key generation 128 256 0.0061 0.001
Remaining part 128 256 0.00126 0.00069
Key Generation 128 512 82.612 33.795
Primes generation 128 512 82.603 33.795
PRF key generation 128 512 0.0086 0.0018
Remaining part 128 512 0.00096 0.00065
Table 6.7: Key Generation algorithm in seconds.
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We can see from the resulting timings that when the value of k increases, the
average value can decrease. We can try to justify this fact remembering the algo-
rithm of generation of the two k-quasi-safe primes p and q. At each iteration of such
algorithm we have to generate a random prime p0 whose dimension depends on k
and we have to verify the primality of the entire prime p; recall that p = 2kp0 + 1,
so if k increases, the bit-size of p0 decreases. This leads to a reduction of the times,
since we have to generate a prime p0 smaller, while the bit-size of the probable prime
p to check remains the same (it depends on the security parameter).
6.2.2 Encoding
The second algorithm we analyze is the encoding algorithm.
In this case, we consider the resulting timings of the complete Encode algorithm
and the two sub-parts related to the generation of the ciphertext and of the tag.
Even in this case, we provide the results over sets of 100 iterations for each
experiment. We also consider two cases:
(a) messages randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1};
(b) random messages of 32 bits.
Table 6.8 shows the experiments for the case (a) while Table 6.9 shows the
experiments for the case (b) . In both cases, the resulting timings are expressed in
milliseconds.
6.2.3 Computation
The third algorithm we analyze is the compute algorithm. We perform 10 iterations
for each experiment, varying the number n of messages over which we make the
computation, choosing n equal to 1000, 10000, 100000.
We generate a random function of n random coe cients, in {0, ...,2k   1}, at
each iteration of every experiment. Therefore we consider n ⌧ labels and only one
  label at each iteration of every experiment.
Table 6.10 shows the experiments, describing the resulting timings in seconds.
In Table 6.11 and in Table 6.12 we provide the resulting timings of other exper-
iments. We test two binary operations:
f(m1,m2) = m1 +m2, with m1, m2 random messages of 32 bits;
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  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Encoding 80 128 2.914 0.33
Cipher. generation 80 128 0.292 0.053
Tag generation 80 128 2.621 0.291
Encoding 128 128 67.178 0.655
Cipher. generation 128 128 1.919 1.936
Tag generation 128 128 65.247 0.612
Encoding 128 256 65.723 0.505
Cipher. generation 128 256 3.859 0.163
Tag generation 128 256 61.864 0.481
Encoding 128 512 60.42 0.144
Cipher. generation 128 512 7.20 0.03
Tag generation 128 512 52.831 0.128
Table 6.8: Encode algorithm and its sub-parts for messages randomly picked in
{0, ...,2k   1}. Results in milliseconds.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Encoding 80 128 3.186 0.274
Cipher. generation 80 128 0 0
Tag generation 80 128 3.186 0.274
Encoding 128 128 66.634 0.154
Cipher. generation 128 128 1.962 0.013
Tag generation 128 128 64.67 0.15
Encoding 128 256 46.992 0.55
Cipher. generation 128 256 2.69 0.06
Tag generation 128 256 44.293 0.536
Encoding 128 512 43.398 0.68
Cipher. generation 128 512 5.185 0.185
Tag generation 128 512 38.312 0.692
Table 6.9: Encode algorithm and its sub-parts for random messages of 32 bits.
Results in milliseconds.
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n   k Average (s) Standard deviation (s)
1000 80 128 0.217 0.00665
10000 80 128 2.196 0.25
100000 80 128 29.627 0.514
1000 128 128 2 0.178
10000 128 128 20.674 0.0376
100000 128 128 173.812 19.747
1000 128 256 4.610 0.076
10000 128 256 41.489 0.061
100000 128 256 328.494 24.824
1000 128 512 7.535 0.64
10000 128 512 80.899 0.084
100000 128 512 707.738 153.271
Table 6.10: Compute algorithm in seconds.
g(m1,m2) = c1m1 + c2m2, with m1, m2 random messages of 32 bits and c1, c2
coe cients of 32 bits.
We perform 100 iterations for each experiment.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
128 80 0.0017 0.0045
128 128 0.019 0.0042
128 256 0.022 0.0028
128 512 0.018 0.0041
Table 6.11: Compute algorithm for f(m1,m2) = m1 +m2. Results in milliseconds.
6.2.4 Decoding
The last algorithm we analyze is the Decode algorithm.
We decided to test the e cient version of the Decode algorithm, verifying the
performances of the O✏ineDecode algorithm and of the OnlineDecode algorithm.
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  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
128 80 0.143 0.0077
128 128 0.824 0.02
128 256 0.801 0.116
128 512 0.689 0.301
Table 6.12: Compute algorithm for g(m1,m2) = c1m1 + c2m2. Results in
milliseconds.
O✏ine decoding
The performances of the O✏ineDecode algorithm depend on the number of mes-
sages to encode. As we have done for the Computation algorithm, we generate a
random function of n random coe cients, in {0, ...,2k 1}, at each iteration of every
experiment. Therefore we consider n ⌧ labels at each iteration of every experiment;
we consider again results over a set of 10 iterations for each experiment. We vary
the number n of tau labels, choosing n equal to 1000, 10000, 100000.
Table 6.13 shows the experiments, describing the resulting timings in seconds.
n   k Average(s) Standard deviation(s)
1000 80 128 0.00633 0.000775
10000 80 128 0.0568 0.001
100000 80 128 0.796 0.0669
1000 128 128 0.0102 0.00217
10000 128 128 0.111 0.00238
100000 128 128 0.933 0.18
1000 128 256 0.0119 0.000123
10000 128 256 0.106 0.001
100000 128 256 0.911 0.175
1000 128 512 0.00947 0.000862
10000 128 512 0.109 0.0025
100000 128 512 0.913 0.211
Table 6.13: O✏ineDecode algorithm in seconds.
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In Table 6.14 and in Table 6.15 we provide the resulting timings of other exper-
iments. We test the O✏ineDecode algorithm of the two binary operations used to
test the Compute algorithm:
f(m1,m2) = m1 +m2, with m1, m2 random messages of 32 bits;
g(m1,m2) = c1m1 + c2m2, with m1, m2 random messages of 32 bits and c1, c2
coe cients of 32 bits.
We perform 100 iterations for each experiment.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
80 128 0.024 0.017
128 128 0.03 0.007
128 256 0.035 0.005
128 512 0.031 0.007
Table 6.14: O✏ineDecode algorithm for f(m1,m2) = m1 +m2. Results in
milliseconds.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
80 128 0.024 0.006
128 128 0.033 0.006
128 256 0.031 0.007
128 512 0.026 0.012
Table 6.15: O✏ineDecode algorithm for g(m1,m2) = c1m1 + c2m2. Results in
milliseconds.
Online decoding
Regarding the OnlineDecode algorithm, we consider the resulting timings of the en-
tire OnlineDecode algorithm and those of the verification step and of the decryption
algorithm
Even in this case, we provide the results over sets of 100 iterations for each
experiment. We consider two cases:
111
6 – Experiments
(a) online decoding of encodings of messages randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1};
(b) online decoding of encodings of random messages of 32 bits.
Table 6.16 shows the experiments for the case (a) while Table 6.17 shows the
experiments for the case (b) . In both cases, the resulting timings are expressed in
milliseconds.
  k Average (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
OnlineDecode 80 128 5.977 1.18
Verification 80 128 2.324 1.064
Decryption 80 128 3.653 0.501
OnlineDecode 128 128 68.686 1.609
Verification 128 128 46.256 1.269
Decryption 128 128 22.429 0.727
OnlineDecode 128 256 191.758 3.150
Verification 128 256 70.151 0.463
Decryption 128 256 121.605 3.111
OnlineDecode 128 128 475.714 7.772
Verification 128 256 55.217 0.281
Decryption 128 512 420.495 7.742
Table 6.16: OnlineDecode algorithm and its sub-parts for encodings of messages
randomly picked in {0, ...,2k   1}. Results in milliseconds.
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  k Average Standard deviation
OnlineDecode 80 128 4.679 0.409
Verification 80 128 1.911 0.213
Decryption 80 128 2.767 0.23
OnlineDecode 128 128 91.605 0.754
Verification 128 128 64.737 0.091
Decryption 128 128 26.866 0.76
OnlineDecode 128 256 162.190 4.653
Verification 128 256 71.573 2.699
Decryption 128 256 90.614 2.794
OnlineDecode 128 128 231.089 3.37
Verification 128 256 38.464 0.355
Decryption 128 512 192.624 3.297
Table 6.17: OnlineDecode algorithm and its sub-parts for encodings of random
messages of 32 bits. Results in milliseconds.
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Conclusions
In this thesis we have tackled the problem of secure outsourcing of data and com-
putation. We presented the security issues related to this problem, namely integrity
and privacy and we analysed some possible solutions to these two issues, exploiting
advanced cryptographic tools, such as Homomorphic Message Authenticators and
Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
Our contribution is both theoretical and practical.
Considering our theoretical contribution, using as starting points the articles of
[3] and [12], we have defined the new Outsourcing scheme with the aim of realizing
a very generic and flexible model that might be employed to represent several se-
cure outsourcing schemes. Such model can be used to represent secure outsourcing
schemes that provide only integrity, only privacy or, interestingly, integrity with
privacy. Using our new model we also re-defined an highly e cient scheme con-
structed in [12], that we called Outsourcinglin and that is a scheme for computing
multi-variate polynomials of degree 1 over the ring Z2k .
Considering our practical contribution, we built a Framework to implement the
Outsourcing scheme achieving, in this way, one of the main goals of this thesis.
Then, such Framework has been tested to realize several implementations, specifi-
cally the implementation of the Joye-Libert cryptosystem and the implementation
of our Outsourcinglin scheme.
In the context of this practical work, the thesis also led to some novel contribu-
tions:
the design and the implementation, in collaboration with Dario Fiore, of a new
decryption algorithm for the Joye-Libert encryption scheme, that performs
better than the algorithms proposed by the authors in [18];
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the implementation of the amortized-closed-form e cient pseudorandom func-
tion of [12]. There was no prior implementation of this function and it repre-
sented a non trivial work, which can become useful in other contexts.
The implementations have been used to execute several tests for measuring the
timing performances of the main algorithms. Since there were no existing imple-
mentations of the Outsourcinglin scheme, this allowed to analyse its behaviour in
applications of practical interest.
The Framework has been created with the idea of helping in the implementa-
tion of theoretical secure outsourcing schemes. We hope that the framework might
become a concrete point of reference for all those researchers, students or simply
users that wish to implement and test own secure outsourcing schemes. While the
work of the thesis accomplished the goals we had set (namely to build and use such
framework), future work could be done.
Possible directions include: improving and optimizing our implementations; us-
ing the framework to implement more outsourcing schemes and to compare several
of them; using the framework to realize secure outsourcing applications.
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Block cipher
1 A block cipher is a deterministic algorithm operating on fixed groups of bits,
called blocks, with an unvarying transformation that is specified by a symmetric key.
The block size depends on the cipher being used, but it is usually 64 or 128 bits. A
symmetric cipher uses linear and non-linear transformation to encrypt and decrypt
messages; linear transformations are operations such as rotate and bit shifts, non-
linear transformations include XOR, substitutions using a S-box, and permutations
using a P-box. Linear and non-linear transformations are sometimes referred to as
confusion and di↵usion.
Among all the several existing block ciphers, probably one of the most used in
practice is the AES. It specifies a cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect
electronic data. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt
(encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. The AES algorithm is capable of
using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in
blocks of 128 bits. It has been adopted as a U.S. government Federal Information
Processing Standard: FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). It has
supersedes the Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher.
Modes of operation
There are several ways to use PRFs to encrypt arbitrarily long messages from
fixed length PRFs. Historically, these methods are called modes of operation.
If we would like to encrypt data which is 64 bytes long, and we have chosen a
cipher with a block size of 128 bits, the cipher will break the 64 bytes into four
blocks, 128 bits each ( Fig. 8.1). How the blocks are encrypted depends on the
mode of operation.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher
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Figure 7.1: Blocking Plain Text.
In early cryptography (circa 1980), there were four approved modes from which
to chose: ECB, CBC, OFB, and CFB. These modes were standardized (among
others) in FIPS 81, ANSI X3.106, and ISO/IEC 10116. Later came modes such as
CTR and CTS. CTR and CTS were standardized in NIST SP800-38A (SP800-38A
recognized the four modes of FIPS 81, while ISO 10116 was updated). Modes of
operation specify how the output of the previous rounds are used as input to the
subsequent rounds. Depending on the desired properties of the cipher, we would
select di↵erent modes.
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